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ABSTRACT
I document a new empirical pattern of internal mobility in the United States. Namely, county-tocounty migration and commuting drop off discretely at state borders. People are three times as
likely to move to a county 15 miles away, but in the same state, than to move to an equally
distant county in a different state. These gaps remain even among neighboring counties or
counties in the same commuting zone. This pattern is not explained by differences in county
characteristics, is not driven by any particular demographic group, and is not explained by
pecuniary costs such as differences in state occupational licensing, taxes, or transfer program
generosity. However, county-to-county social connectedness (as measured by the number of
Facebook linkages) follows a similar pattern. Although the patterns in social networks would be
consistent with information frictions, nonpecuniary psychic costs, or behavioral biases such as a
sate identity or home bias, the data suggest that state identity and home bias play an outsized
role. This empirical pattern has real economic impacts. Building on existing methods, I show
that employment in border counties adjusts more slowly after local economic shocks relative to
interior counties. These counties also exhibit less in-migration and in-commuting, suggesting the
lack of mobility leads to slower labor market adjustment.
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Introduction

The United States has traditionally been seen as a highly mobile country, with nearly one
in five people changing their county of residence every five years. Even though internal migration has steadily declined over the past 40 years, the United States still exhibits higher
internal mobility than most European countries (Molloy et al., 2011). Geographic mobility
is often viewed as both a chance for individuals to find better job opportunities and a mechanism through which places adjust to local economic shocks, contributing to labor market
fluidity and economic dynamism (Blanchard and Katz, 1992; Molloy et al., 2016). However, there is significant heterogeneity in local economic conditions across the country. Most
counties are within 60 miles of another county that has higher average wages, lower average
house prices, or both (Appendix Table A1). Although there might be other local characteristics that offset these raw spatial differences, it seems plausible that many individuals could
encounter employment or housing “opportunities” through short distance mobility, either
migration or commuting. Frictions that reduce or limit internal mobility could lead to less
dynamic local economies.
I document a previously undocumented aspect of U.S. internal migration and commuting that has implications for labor market fluidity and dynamism. Using the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) county-to-county migration data, and Longitudinal Employer-Household
Data (LEHD) Origin Destination Employment Statistics (LODES) data on county-to-county
commute flows, I show that even conditional on distance, county-to-county migration and
commute flows drop significantly when a state border lies between the two counties. People
are three times as likely to move to a different county in the same state than to an equally
distant county in a different state. People are about twice as likely to commute to a different county in the same state as to an equally distant county in a different state. In other
words, state borders reduce both long-term and temporary human mobility. In this paper,
I document the extent of these empirical patterns, explore potential explanations for why
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this cross-border drop in mobility exists, and evaluate how this empirically evident mobility
friction impacts the way local labor markets adjust to cyclical economic shocks.
The canonical migration choice model suggests that a discontinuous drop in migration
rates at state borders could be due to either differences in location-specific utility or differences in moving costs. This does not appear to be the case. As I document, the gap in
migration and commute rates associated with state borders does not appear to be driven by
differences in local characteristics that could drive differences in utility. The cross-border
mobility gap does not close if I control for origin and destination fixed effects or even if I
control for differences between the origin and destination in labor market characteristics,
industry composition, demographic composition, natural amenities, political leaning, home
values, or local test scores. Furthermore, this gap persists when I focus on counties that we
would traditionally think of as being more interconnected and similar, such as counties in
the same metropolitan statistical area (MSA) or commuting zone (CZ) or even neighboring
counties on state borders.
Differential changes in pecuniary costs at state borders from state-level regulation, such
as differences in occupational licensing, state income taxation, or state transfer policy, also
do not explain the mobility gap. Because the discontinuity is present for both migration
and commute flows, it likely is not driven by pecuniary adjustment costs associated with
moving across state lines (e.g., updating vehicle registration or driver’s licenses). In American Community Survey (ACS) microdata, cross-border migration and commute rates do
not statistically differ across most demographic groups (i.e., age, race/ethnicity, gender, employment, or family structure), suggesting that differences in the preferences or costs across
these groups do not explain the pattern. There are, however, distinct differences based on
whether or not the individual was initially residing in his or her birth state. Among those
who moved in the past year, individuals originally living in their birth state are over 60
percent less likely to move out of state than people in the same local area who were born in
a different state.
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Consistent with origin ties and county-to-county connectedness playing a role, I find a
similar geographic discontinuity in Facebook friendship rates across state borders, as captured by the Social Connectedness Index (Bailey et al., 2018). On average, people have twice
as many Facebook friends in a same-state county 15 miles away as in a cross-border county
15 miles away. When I control for the Facebook network linkages between the origin and
destination, the decrease in migration and commuting associated with state borders falls
substantially, suggesting that most of the discontinuity in mobility is empirically explained
by social network strength or something correlated with the social network.
Although causality could run in both directions, the correlation between cross-border
mobility and network strength is consistent with three county-to-county connectedness augmentations of the simple migration model. First, weaker social networks across state lines
could impose additional nonpecuniary, psychic costs associated with moving (such as leaving
personal ties to community, friends, and family). Second, weaker social networks across the
border could also lead to more information frictions, leaving individuals less informed about
the potential costs and benefits of moving across state lines. Finally, discontinuous drops
in social ties across the state border could also arise if a third factor, like behavioral biases
such as home bias or state identity, simultaneously keeps people from moving and making
social connections across state lines. A strong state identity could affect mobility, regardless
of the presence of local ties to family and friends.
Both psychic costs and information frictions would imply that state borders reduce migration flows because their placement is correlated with people’s network borders. This does
appear to be the case. Using connected communities, as defined by Bailey et al. (2018),
to capture contiguous regions of strong county-to-county friendship linkages, we see that
connected community borders often approximate state borders, although there are places
where the state borders and network borders deviate. In a horse-race regression allowing
both the actual state border and the social network border to have separate impacts, most
of the effect loads on the actual state borders, explaining 3–6 times as much as the social
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network borders. This pattern is inconsistent with the psychic cost of abandoning personal
ties or information frictions due to weak social ties being the main drivers of the drop in
mobility precisely at state borders.
There is, however, suggestive evidence that state identity is not only common but that it
influences migration decisions. Analysis of Pew Research Center data on mobility (Pew Research Center, 2009) suggests that as much as 68 percent of people “identify” with their birth
state. Among survey participants, exhibiting a birth-state identity reduces the likelihood of
ever leaving one’s birth state by 35.3 percentage points (nearly 64 percent) and increases
the preference to live in one’s birth state over all other states by 28.1 percentage points
(80 percent). In response to hypothetical questions about moving, people with a birth-state
identity who currently live in their state of birth are significantly less likely to consider a
move. In contrast, exhibiting a birth-state identity has no impact on the probability of making a move if the individual is currently living outside their state of birth. This is consistent
with an endowment effect in migration, where birth-state identity imposes additional costs
for moves out of the originally endowed birth state. Importantly, these patterns persist even
when controlling for individuals’ family ties or ties to amenities in the area they currently
live in, suggesting birth-state identity is a factor independent of other local ties.
This work builds on existing research exploring the role of local ties (Zabek, 2020),
rootedness (Kosar et al., 2020), and migration costs (Desmet et al., 2018). Using a spatial
equilibrium framework, Zabek (2020) finds that local ties tend to keep people near their
birthplace, leading to muted migration responses to local economic shocks. In this work,
“local ties” is a conceptual term, meant to capture the concept that people tend to live near
their birthplace for unexplained reasons, with little evidence of what creates the local tie.
As I document, people not only tend to stay near their birthplace, but they are significantly
less likely to leave their birth state, even if they live close to the state border. Although local
ties could reflect the psychic cost of leaving friends and family, the analysis here suggests
that this is not what drives hesitancy to cross state borders. Rather, state borders seem
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to have a separate effect, potentially driven by home bias or state identity. This identity
appears to have a distinct effect from family and other personal ties. Kosar et al. (2020)
used stated-preference survey methods to document how various costs, including nonmoney
costs, affect people’s preferences about migration. They find that nonmoney moving costs
are large, especially for individuals who self-identify as “rooted” to their location. State
identity could contribute to these large nonmoney moving costs. Spatial economic models
also highlight the role of migration costs, but this is often an all-encompassing term meant to
capture the fact that there are regional wage differences that are not equalized by migration
(Desmet et al., 2018). In this work, I shed light on what might be driving these migration
costs and highlight the relative isolation of states.
Regardless of the mechanism behind the empirical pattern, this feature of U.S. internal
migration affects the dynamic adjustment of labor markets to local shocks. Following existing
methods exploring the economic recovery from the Great Recession (Hershbein and Stuart,
2020), I show that counties at the state border, where this mobility friction is plausibly more
binding, see weaker recoveries in employment. Ten years after the initial cyclical shock,
employment measures in border counties have recovered approximately 40 percent less than
other counties in the same state. Border counties also see significantly less in-migration
and in-commuting during the recovery period, leading to persistently worse labor market
outcomes. Proximity to state borders leads to differences in local labor market dynamism
and affects the ability of labor markets adjust to local cyclical shocks. Cross-state labor
markets appear to be less connected than we might expect, a priori, potentially contributing
to the persistent geographic heterogeneity in labor market conditions and economic mobility
(Chetty et al., 2014) observed across the United States.

2

County-to-County Mobility Data

Unlike many other developed countries, the United States does not maintain administrative
residential histories. To document patterns of internal migration and related trends, I use
5

several sources, which I briefly outline here, with full details in the data appendix. The
annual IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) county-to-county migration flows data are constructed
by tracking the number of tax units and tax exemptions (to proxy for households and people)
that change their tax form 1040 filing county from one filing year to the next. I divide the
number of exemptions by the origin county population (in thousands) to measure the number
of migrants per 1,000 people.
To capture county-to-county commute flows I use the LEHD Origin Destination Employment Statistics (LODES). These measures are constructed from LEHD microdata derived
from unemployment insurance wage records. For over 90 percent of workers in the wage
records, place of residence and place of employment are recorded, allowing the construction
of publicly available county-to-county flows. I divide the number of workers by the county
population to measure the number of commuters per 1,000 people.
Because the IRS data do not provide migration flows for subpopulations, I supplement
this data with migration microdata from the 2012–2017 annual American Community Survey (ACS).1 The ACS surveys over one million US households each year and documents
individual and household measures ranging from household structure and demographics to
employment and place of residency in the previous year.2 I use the ACS microdata to examine
migration and place-of-work differences across individual characteristics, like demographics,
occupation, and place of birth.
To understand the impact of state borders on social networks, I use the Social Connectedness Index (SCI) which maps county-to-county Facebook friendship networks Bailey et al.
(2018). This data takes a snapshot of active Facebook users in 2016 and reports the number
of Facebook friends in each county pair, scaled by an unobserved scalar multiple to maintain
privacy. I supplement these data with annual Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results
(SEER) county population counts and state policy data from various sources. Each of these
1

The LODES provides flows for subgroups, but only by broad age, education, and industry categories.
I do not use data from earlier years, because the smallest geographic measure, public use microdata
area (PUMA) definitions, were updated in 2012.
2
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sources is documented in full in the data appendix.

3

County-to-County Mobility: The Empirical Pattern

3.1

State Borders and County-to-County Migration and Commuting

The relationship between distance and migration rates has long been documented (Schwartz,
1973). Average migration rates drop smoothly as the distance between an origin and a
potential destination increases. However, even in the raw IRS migration data, the magnitude
of this pattern depends on whether the origin and destination counties are in the same state.
In Figure 1, I plot the average number of migrants per 1,000 residents of the origin county, in
2017, in one-mile bins for all county pairs in the continental U.S., with population centroids
15–60 miles apart.3 These average migration rates are plotted separately for county pairs
in the same state, and county pairs separated by a state border. Both within-state and
across-state migration rates fall as distance increases, but there is a gap in levels. At the
same distance, migration rates to same-state counties are approximately three times as high
as migration rates to cross-state counties. The pattern is similar when looking at countyto-county commute rates: conditional on distance, commute rates are approximately twice
as high among same-state county pairs relative to cross-border pairs. State borders are
associated with raw differences in both residential and employment mobility. This is the
first work examining the role of state borders on human mobility and is consistent with work
suggesting that state borders impose large trade barriers (Coughlin and Novy, 2012).
The first goal of this paper is to unpack these patterns to determine whether the state
border discontinuity is significant, and whether it is sensitive to other potential mediation
factors. As such, I will estimate the following parameterized version of the above analysis
3

I focus on these “close” county pairs because there is sufficient coverage of both within-state and crossstate pairs. There are no cross-border county pairs that have population centroids less than six miles apart.
I restrict to county pairs at least 15 miles apart to avoid comparisons with few observations. I also limit
to counties 60 miles or less apart to avoid a compositional shift from typically sized counties to large states
and counties in the West. The pattern is similar if I include county pairs that are closer or farther away
(Appendix Figure A4).
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throughout:

Yod =

59
X

βb (Diff. State*b Miles Apart) + γb (b Miles Apart) + εod

(1)

b=15

The outcomes of interest are the origin/destination specific number of migrants per 1,000
people at the origin and the origin/destination specific number of commuters per 1,000
people. The explanatory variables are the interactions between an indicator for whether the
counties are in different states and a vector of one-mile-distance bin indicators. The 60-mile
bin is omitted as the reference group. Average migration rates among counties 60 miles apart
are quite low, with only about one migrant per 10,000 people. The γb coefficients trace out
the migration/commute rates for counties in the same state, while the βb coefficients indicate
how much lower the migration/commute flows are for counties that are in the same distance
bin, but in a different state. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the origin county
level. Throughout, I present the coefficients graphically, with the γb coefficients and the total
effect for counties in different states (βb + γb ) plotted with 95 percent confidence intervals.
These point estimates are provided in Appendix Figure A1 and match the means estimated
in Figure 1, since migration and commuting levels in the omitted group is approximately
zero. I use the final-year that IRS migration data are available, 2017, so there is only one
observation per origin/destination pair. But, as seen in Appendix Figure A2, the stateborder discontinuity is similar for all years available in the data—the years since 1992 for
migration and 2003 for commuting.
This flexible parameterization does not impose strong assumptions on the way distance
impacts mobility, but it also does not provide a concise estimate of how state borders reduce
mobility. To distill the impact of state borders on migration and commute rates into a single
parameter, I will estimate the ratio of area under the curve for cross-state county pairs
relative to the area under the curve for within-state county pairs using Riemann integration
across the one-mile-distance bins. From the baseline estimates in Figure 1, state borders
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reduce migration rates by 72 percent for county pairs between 15 and 60 miles apart. This
gap is significant, with 95 percent confidence intervals of 68 and 76 percent. There is a
similar 74 percent reduction in commute rates.

Sensitivity to Controls
Counties across the country differ on many dimensions, which are not controlled for in the
previous equation and could potentially explain the cross-border differences in mobility. To
test the sensitivity of the state-border discontinuity, I adjust Equation (1) to include origin
fixed effects to control for characteristics of the origin; destination fixed effects to control for
characteristics of the destination; and observable origin/destination pair–specific differences
in local labor market, population, housing market, and local amenity measures to control
for pairwise differences as follows

Yod =

59
X

′
βb (Diff. State*b Miles Apart) + γb (b Miles Apart) + Xod
Γ + ϕo + δd + εod

(2)

b=15

The Xod vector includes differences in origin and destination labor markets (unemployment
rates, employment-to-population ratios, average weekly wages, number of establishments,
and industry shares); differences in the total population, as well as differences in the gender, racial, ethnic, and age composition of the origin and destination; differences in natural
amenities such as the average temperature in January and July, average sunlight in January, average humidity in July, and USDA natural amenity score; differences in the 2016
presidential Republican vote share; differences in average home value; and differences in average math and reading standardized test scores from the Stanford Education Data Archive
(SEDA) (Fahle et al., 2021). As seen in Figure 1 and throughout the paper, controlling for
demographic, economic, local amenity, and housing market differences between the origin
and destination (the lighter plotted points with confidence intervals) does not close the gap.
State borders are still associated with a 67 percent reduction in migration rates and a 76
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percent reduction in commuting.

Sensitivity to Measurement of Distance
Comparing the direct distance between county population centroids might provide the wrong
comparison. If cross-state road networks are more sparse, or if state borders correspond with
natural features likes rivers (as is the case for at least one county in 41 states), travel across
state lines might be more costly, even if equidistant. However, if I calculate the GPS travel
time between each county pair and estimate Equations (1) and (2), but measure distance in
terms of minutes of travel, the role of state borders is similar (left panel of Figure 2).4

Sensitivity to Sample Composition
The pattern is not driven by compositional differences between the pairs of same-state and
cross-state counties in the sample. Omitting counties without a cross-border county pair
within 60 miles (see the map in Figure A3), like those in central Texas or Michigan, does
not affect the distance gradient and state-border penalty is essentially unchanged (Figure
2).5 The gap persists if I exclude county-to-county flows of zero (Appendix Figure A6),6
and is present across the Northeast, Midwest, and South (Appendix Figure A7), with some
evidence in the West where counties are large.
Furthermore, the pattern persists when focusing on county pairs we ex ante expect to be
close and economically connected. In Figure 3 I plot the coefficients from Equation (2) but
limit the sample to county pairs in the same commuting zone, in commuting zones that cross
state borders (left panel), county pairs in the same cross-border metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) (middle panel), or neighboring counties on state borders (right panel).7 Even with
4

As seen in Appendix Figure A9, the state border penalty is similar for counties separated by land or
by rivers.
5
Throughout the rest of the analysis I will impose this restriction to avoid compositional changes, but
the patterns are unchanged if we include all county pairs within 60 miles of each other.
6
The IRS data are censored for privacy, so county-to-county flows below 20 are not provided. As such,
these flows are treated as flows of zero.
7
When looking at neighboring counties, distance is restricted to 45 miles or less, as there are very
few neighboring counties with population centroids more than 45 miles apart. Among the subsample of
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these considerably smaller samples, there is still a significant reduction in migration and
commuting associated with the state border. State borders are associated with a reduction
in county-to-county mobility, even among places that we would expect to be similar or
by construction connected.8 As seen in Appendix Figure A8, this pattern also holds for
individual MSAs, even when we focus on counties in well-known cross-state MSAs like New
York City; Washington, D.C.; or Kansas City.
This pattern has not been documented previously and is perhaps unexpected, as there
are no legal or residency restrictions associated with state borders (as there are with national
borders) and since the U.S. is seen as highly mobile relative to other countries (Molloy et
al., 2011). Given that this empirical pattern exists, the remainder of this paper explores
potential mechanisms behind the state-border discontinuity in mobility and documents to
what extent this empirical feature of mobility impacts the dynamism of local labor markets
in the wake of local economic shocks.

4

Potential Explanations

To codify potential explanatory mechanisms, I turn to the canonical model of migration
choice that builds on the early work of Sjaastad (1962). In its simplest form, the decision
to migrate is characterized as a comparison between the utility gain and the cost associated
with moving from origin o to destination d, as follows:

M oveiod =




1 if ui (Xd ) − ui (Xo ) ≥ ciod

(3)



0 else
neighboring counties, standard errors are large when using one-mile bins. This is because there are relatively
few observations in each one-mile bin. The differences are more precisely estimated when larger bins that
contain more observations are used.
8
The pattern is similar if I restrict the sample to counties in the same Designated Market Area (DMA),
which captures television broadcast media markets (Appendix Figure A5).
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where utility is a function of location-specific characteristics. The migration rate from o to
d can be captured as the share of the population at o for whom

ciod < c∗iod = ui (Xd ) − ui (Xo ).

(4)

Even in this simple representation of the migration decision, there are several places state
borders could arise. First, discrete changes at state borders in local characteristics that contribute to utility would result in corresponding discrete changes in migration propensities and
migration rates. Second, discontinuities in moving costs between the origin and destination
d at state borders would also affect migration propensities.9 Both potential mechanisms are
plausible. Although spatial equilibrium models (Roback, 1982; Rosen, 1979) highlight the
role of migrants in equalizing differences across places, moving costs are prohibitively large
for many individuals (Bartik, 2018; Kosar et al., 2020), and there is still substantial heterogeneity in labor market and housing market conditions across geography (Bartik, 2018).
Economic geography models that do incorporate moving costs (Desmet et al., 2018; Redding
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017) often indirectly inferred these costs from differences in population
and migration rather than tying them to institutional or social features.
It is also possible that the model in Equation (3) is too simple. Alternative mechanisms,
such as psychic costs, information frictions, or behavioral biases, not captured in the model
above, might also come into play by “tying” or “connecting” counties together. If state
borders influence these parameters, discrete changes in migration rates could also arise.
Building on this theory and previous work exploring the drivers of migration behavior, I
next explore the role of leading potential mechanisms.
9

Adding multiple potential destination turns the decision into a multinomial decision in which the individual chooses the destination where ui (Xd ) − ui (Xo ) − ciod is the largest. For state borders to matter,
the same potential channels are present, but the relative importance of these channels in other potential
destinations will also matter.
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4.1

Differences in Utility

Discrete changes in labor market opportunities, demographic characteristics, amenities, or
housing markets at state borders could result in discrete differences in utility across state
borders. In the language of spatial economics, discontinuous changes in both exogenous (geographic features) and endogenous (economic and social features) amenities at state borders
could explain the pattern (Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017). Controlling for observable
differences in these characteristics does not eliminate the discontinuity in migration or commuting at the state border (Figure 1), suggesting they do not drive the predictive power of
state borders. The pattern also persists when limiting the sample to counties in the same
commuting zone, MSA, or even among neighboring counties, where we would expect counties
to be more similar.
To further rule out discrete changes in local characteristics, I examine how average characteristics in 2017 change as the distance between origin and destination decreases. I examine
all of the same measures controlled for in Equation (2). For each county pair there are flows in
two directions, so by construction, differences between the origin and destination by distance
will be mean zero. For this reason, I examine a more conservative measure of absolute differences in county pair characteristics. I examine origin/destination differences in measures
that are frequently used as controls (or outcomes) in labor market and demographic research.
I examine labor market measures (the unemployment rate, employment-to-population ratio,
average weekly wages, number of establishments); industry shares (shares in natural resources and mining, construction, manufacturing, trade, information, finance, professional,
education and health, hospitality, public sector, and all others); demographics (total population, share female, non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic other, Hispanic,
under 20, 20–34, 35–49, 50–64, and 65 and older); natural amenities (January average temperature, January average sunlight, July average temperature, July average humidity, and
the USDA natural amenities scale); the 2016 presidential Republican vote share; the county
housing price index, converted to dollars using the median house value from 2000; and the
13

county average standardized math and reading/language arts test score for third through
eighth grade (averaged over 2008–2017), obtained from SEDA (Fahle et al., 2021). These
plots are presented in Appendix Figures A10 and A11. As noted above, my analysis focuses
on county pairs that are between 15 and 60 miles apart because there are few county pairs
less than 15 miles apart. For each measure, I shade in gray origin/destination pairs that are
less than 15 miles apart. Consistent with there being few observations within 15 miles of
each other, the spread increases and standard errors on the local linear polynomials become
large as the distance falls below 15 miles.10 If we focus on counties 15 to 60 miles apart, differences in average local labor market, demographics, local amenities, vote share, or housing
market measures appear similar regardless of a state border separating the counties.

4.2

Differences in Pecuniary, Moving Costs

There are many pecuniary costs associated with moving (e.g., renting a moving truck or
hiring movers). Most of these would be incurred whether the move was across a state border
or not. However, there are some pecuniary costs associated with moving that differentially
impact in-state and cross-state moves. For example, you are required to renew your license
and car registration when you move to another state, but not if you move to a different
county in the same state. Similarly, state policies might lead to differential pecuniary costs
associated with cross-state moves.
The costs faced when considering residential moves (migration) and employment moves
(commuting) often differ. For example, commuters can cross state lines without incurring
adjustment costs associated with moving (such as updating registration), but they still face
some costs, such as state-level taxation. Because the pattern for migration and commuting
is similar, the impact of state borders is likely not solely driven by pecuniary adjustment
costs.11 However, I explore the potential role of several policy-induced mobility costs that
10
This fact is further highlighted in Appendix Figure A12, where each point is weighted by the number
of county pairs.
11
One potential adjustment cost commuters would still face is the ease with which they can cross the
border. This might be particularly challenging if the state border follows a river and there are limited
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have been highlighted in the internal migration literature and could affect both migration
and commuting.

Occupational Licensing
Some states require licenses, certificates, or education/training requirements for someone to
perform certain tasks or occupations.12 In some cases, these requirements do not include
state reciprocity, meaning a qualification in one state is void in another. Johnson and Kleiner
(2020) show that among 22 universally licensed occupations for which licensing exams are
either state-specific or nationally administered, state-specific licensing rules reduce interstate
migration by approximately 7 percent. However, they note that these effect sizes can only
explain a small share of the aggregate time trends in interstate migration.
A comprehensive database of occupational licensing requirements across states and over
time does not exist. Previous research exploring occupation licensing has had to rely on
self-collected records state by state for available occupations (Carollo, 2020). Furthermore,
states sometimes license tasks rather than occupations, making it hard to map licenses to
occupation codes. To explore the role of licensure, I exploit the relatively new licensing measures available in the CPS.13 Starting in 2015, CPS respondents were asked three questions
about professional licensing: 1) Do you have a currently active professional certification or a
state or industry license? 2) Were any of your certifications or licenses issued by the federal,
state, or local government? and 3) Is your certification or license required for your job?
Following Kleiner and Soltas (2019), I indicate that an individual’s occupation is licensed by
the government if he or she answers yes to the first and second questions. I then collapse the
CPS data to the state by year and by four-digit occupation code to determine what share of
crossings. In Appendix Figure A9, I plot estimates from a specification similar to Equation (6), where states
with and without river borders are treated separately. Overall, the border penalty is similar whether or not
there is a river at the border.
12
See Carollo (2020) and Kleiner and Soltas (2019) for a comprehensive treatment of the labor market
and welfare impacts of occupational licenses.
13
Results are similar if I instead use occupational licenses as captured by Johnson and Kleiner (2020) or
the National Council of State Legislatures.
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workers in a given occupation and state report that they have a government-issued license.
As Kleiner and Soltas (2019) report, individual reports of licensure contain measurement
error. Even in universally licensed occupations, only about 65 percent of workers are flagged
as having a government license. To improve the signal of these measures, I will consider a
more restrictive measure of occupational licensing (25 percent or more of the workers in the
cell reported a government-issued license) and a less restrictive measure (over 10 percent).14
To determine whether occupational licenses produce the drop in migration and commuting at state borders, I explore cross-state migration and commute rates by occupational
licensure status in the ACS and estimate the following relationship:

Yisot = βLicensed Occupationisot + γo + δs + ϕt + εisot

(5)

The outcomes of interest are a binary indicator that equals 1 if the individual moved
out of state s in the past year and a binary indicator for whether the worker commutes
out of state s (i.e., the place of work is in a different state). The explanatory variable of
interest is the indicator Licensed Occupation, which equals 1 if the individual in year t is in
an occupation (o) in which the share of workers in his or her state (s) that report having
a license exceeds the prespecified threshold (25 or 10 percent). For migration, the state of
residence in the previous year is used to determine licensure status. For commuting, the
current state of residence is used. I explore specifications that only control for occupation
fixed effects; occupation, state, and year fixed effects (as in Equation (5)), and occupation,
state, and occupation-by-year effects. This last specification will compare workers in the
same occupations in licensed and unlicensed states.
Results are reported in Table 1. Among the full population, being in a licensed occupation
has no effect on moving out of state. Limiting the sample to those who move, to account
for selection into moving, does not change the results. The coefficients are typically small,
14

The CPS data does not explicitly separate federal, state, or local licenses. However, by including
occupation by year-fixed effects, universal licensing practices will be absorbed, leaving only state and local
licensure.
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precise, and positive, suggesting that government-issued licensing has no systematic, negative
effect on out-of-state migration. The pattern is similar for out-of-state commuting. Only one
specification (including only occupation fixed effects) suggests a marginally significant 0.3
percentage point reduction in out-of-state commuting associated with occupational licensing.
I explore the impact of occupational licensing on migration and commuting further in
Appendix Figure A13. First I restrict the sample to occupations that are licensed in at least
one state but not all states. I then plot each occupation’s share that moved in the last year on
the x-axis, and the share that moved out-of-state on the y-axis, separately for licensed states
and unlicensed states. Each occupation is weighted by the summed sampling weights for all
of the workers in the cell. The linear relationship between these two migration shares for
nonlicensed occupations is plotted in blue with 95 percent confidence intervals. In general,
occupations that have a higher migrant share have a higher out-of-state migrant share. I
then overlay the plot for cells that have a recorded occupational license. If low out-of-state
migration was caused by occupation licenses, we would expect licensed occupations to be
systematically lower on the y-axis. However, this is not the case: licensed occupations are not
outliers, and, if anything, the linear relationship (in pink) for licensed occupations is steeper.
Commute patterns are similar, although the slope for unlicensed occupations is significantly
steeper, consistent with occupational licensing dampening cross-border commuting. Overall,
there is little evidence that occupational licensing leads to the drop in migration across
state borders, but some evidence that it could contribute to lower levels of cross-border
commuting.

State Taxation
Taxation also varies across state lines, sometimes leading to large differences in tax burden
across state borders. State income tax rates vary between 0.0 and 13.3 percent (Loughead,
2020), and there are also differences in sales tax and corporate tax rates across states. Moretti
and Wilson (2017) find that high performing scientists’ locations are sensitive to state tax
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differences, suggesting that differences in state taxation could explain the pattern around
state borders.
However, if the discontinuity is driven by state-level taxation, we would expect asymmetric behavior, with migration border penalties between low-tax and high-tax states, and
higher flows from high to low tax states. I estimate the following equation to determine
if cross-border county-to-county migration rates differ when the move implies a larger or
smaller tax burden relative to migration within the same state, where taxes are the same.

Yod =

59
X

βb (Higher*Diff. State*b Miles Apart) + θb (Lower*Diff. State*b Miles Apart)

b=15
′
+ γb (b Miles Apart) + Xod
Γ + ϕo + δd + εod (6)

Higher indicates that the state income tax burden in the potential destination county
is greater than the state income tax burden in the origin county. Lower indicates that the
state income tax burden in the destination county is less than or equal to the burden at
the origin. The βb represents the differential mobility to counties in different states with a
higher tax burden, while the θb represents the differential mobility to counties in a different
state with a tax burden less than or equal to the origin county. Both of these are relative to
mobility between counties in the same state (where state taxes are the same), so there are
three mutually exclusive groups.
In Figure 4, I show whether migration and commuting patterns differ for cross-state
county pairs with high-to-low and low-to-high income, sales, and corporate tax burdens. Using tax burden estimates from the NBER TAXSIM, I examine how the role of state borders
differs for households that are married and filing jointly with two children and $75,000 of
annual income in the left column. Conditional on distance, migration and commute rates
to both higher and lower income tax destinations are lower than to counties in the same
state. Furthermore, the patterns for high-to-low and low-to-high flows are not statistically
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distinguishable.15 The patterns are similar for states’ sales tax rates, shown in the middle
column. The point estimates for commuting to counties in lower-sales-tax states are consistently higher (e.g., the border penalty is smaller), but not statistically different. The border
penalty is no different for migration or commuting to counties in states with higher or lower
corporate tax rates (right column). There is no consistent evidence that differences in state
taxation drive, or mediate, the drop in mobility associated with state borders.
Spatial equilibrium models (Roback, 1982; Rosen, 1979) would suggest that long-standing
differences in tax rates would lead to differential sorting, causing the utility value of areas to
equilibrate across all dimensions. As such, we might not observe differences when examining
equilibrium migration rates. However, the difference in tax burdens might vary across origin
destination pairs or throughout the income distribution, meaning that for some subgroups,
a move would be associated with a smaller tax burden, while other groups could experience
a tax increase. For this reason, I also examine income tax burdens for various family types
(single, married, with dependents) at multiple income levels to see whether certain subpopulations’ mobility patterns respond (Appendix A15, A17, A16). I find that there are no
systematic differences across any of the income levels or family types.
Additionally, turning to the ACS microdata, I can focus on differences in the household’s
specific tax burden associated with a potential move. For family units in the 2012–2017
ACS microdata, I use TAXSIM to calculate their income specific state and federal income
tax burden. By moving the focus to a household, rather than a county-to-county migration flow, identifying the potential destination is not straightforward. To focus on the origin/destination decisions that ex ante are the most likely, I limit the sample to families
originally living in commuting zones that cross state lines, and then calculate the average
15

Even if tax rates are the same, filing state taxes across multiple states could impose another burden,
potentially reducing mobility. Some states have state tax reciprocity agreements. For example, residents of
Maryland who work in Virginia or D.C. will have Maryland state taxes withheld and thus only need to file
taxes in Maryland (see Appendix for a full list of tax reciprocity agreements). As seen in Appendix Figure
A14, the affect of state borders on migration and commuting is similar regardless of whether the origin and
destination states have tax reciprocity agreements.
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income tax burden the family would face in the other state(s) in the commuting zone.16 I
then calculate the percentage change in total federal and state income tax burden between
the original state and the other state in the commuting zone.17 In Appendix Figure A18,
I plot the share of migrants who move out of state by the change in the total tax burden
in one-percentage-point bins. If state income tax policy led to the reduction in migration
across the state border, we would expect the share of migrants that move out of state to
decrease as the income tax burden increases with a cross-state move. Instead, there is no
significant relationship between the change in tax burden and the out-of-state migration
share. Although some subpopulations might be sensitive to tax burden changes (such as
star scientists (Moretti and Wilson, 2017)), it does not appear to drive the discontinuity at
state lines.

State Transfer Policy and “Welfare Migration”
State transfer programs also differ, leading to discontinuities in potential low-income benefits
at state lines. These can be thought of as negative costs or benefits associated with a move
and could differentially affect the utility associated with a cross-border move. There is a long
literature exploring interstate migration in response to state low-income benefit generosity,
or “welfare migration.” Gelbach (2004) find that low-income populations that move across
state lines tend to move to higher benefit states, while Borjas (1999) documents a similar
pattern among nonnative immigrants. McKinnish (2005) and McKinnish (2007) find higher
welfare expenditures in high-benefit states on the border of high- and low-benefit states.
Welfare-reform policy changes in the 1990s reduced interstate migration of less-educated
unmarried mothers (Kaestner et al., 2003), while Medicaid expansions associated with the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) did not increase migration to expansion states (Goodman, 2017).
16

For commuting zones with multiple states, I compare the tax burden in the origin state to the average
tax burden in the other states. The pattern is similar if I instead compare the maximum or minimum tax
burden in the other states.
17
As some states do not have an income tax, I consider the federal plus state income tax burden so
percentages will be defined.
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McCauley (2019) finds that migration to health-care benefits in the United Kingdom depends
on access to information. The potential impact of welfare policy on commuting will depend
on whether applicants must establish residency. For example, medicaid recipients must reside
in the state of application, whereas state earned income tax credit (EITC) claimants only
need to earn income and file taxes in the state.
Based on the existing work, I focus on two state transfer policies that affect low-income
households and vary across state lines: ACA medicaid expansions and earned income tax
credit (EITC) state supplements.18 I also examine the role of the effective state or national
minimum wage, another policy that impacts the income of low-income households. For
each of these policies, I estimate a model similar to Equation (6), but Higher and Lower
now reference the benefit generosity in the destination state relative to the origin state.
These estimates are plotted in Figure 5. Migration and commute rates to cross-border
destinations with higher minimum wages, higher state EITCs, and Medicaid expansions
were not significantly different from migration rates to cross-border destinations with lower
benefits, respectively. In all cases, cross-border migration was significantly lower than withinstate migration, conditional on distance. Also, the differences between low-to-high and highto-low benefit states are not significant, suggesting the discontinuity in migration across state
borders is not driven by differences in state transfer policy.1920
18
Since welfare reform in 1996, benefit levels and enrollment in traditional cash welfare, Temporary Aid
for Needy Families (TANF), have been very low, and thus unlikely to drive the aggregate pattern. For this
reason, I only include the analysis in the appendix ( Appendix Figure A19), with no significant differences.
19
Although it is not a state transfer program, state-to-state differences in per-pupil public education
spending could also drive differences in mobility. This likely captures state-level differences in both taxation
and public spending. As seen in Appendix Figure A19 there is not asymmetric migration or commuting to
out-of-state counties with higher or lower prekindergarten-through-twelfth-grade per pupil expenditures.
20
In the LODES, I can also examine census-tract-to-census-tract-level commuting to see if county borders
have a similar effect. Policy variation and costs such as taxes or registration requirements are generally controlled at the state level. However, I still observe a slight county border penalty in tract-to-tract commuting,
suggesting something else is driving the pattern (Appendix Figure A21).
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Differential Costs across Demographic Groups
Consistent with this evidence, cross-border mobility rates are similar across demographic
groups that might face different adjustment costs or have different preferences. Using the
2012–2017 ACS microdata, I calculate the fraction of migrants that move across state lines
for a range of demographic groups (Figure 6). Among migrants, the share that cross state
borders is consistently between 15 and 22 percent across age, gender, race, employment status, marital status, family setting, home ownership, and immigration status groups.21 There
is an education gradient, with the share of migrants moving across state lines increasing with
education. Federal employees are outliers, with roughly 43 percent of migrants moving across
state borders, but otherwise there is no systematic pattern.22 Consistent with the gap not
being driven by pecuniary costs, we only see slightly lower out-of-state migration for families
with children or school-age children, who face additional adjustment costs when changing
school districts, or state and local employees who are more likely to have state-specific pension benefits. The overall pattern is similar when examining the share of commuters that
commute across state lines. For migration, the group with the lowest point estimate consists
of migrants that originally resided in their birth state, while migrants originally residing
outside their birth state are more than twice as likely to move out of state. Out-of-state
commute rates are also twice as high for workers residing outside their birth state, relative
to those in their birth state.
I explore the role of birth-state residence further in Table 2 by estimating

Yipt = βOriginally in Birth Stateipt + Xi′ Γ + δpt + αa + γo + εipt

(7)

The outcome is whether or not individual i—originally living in state and Public Use
Microdata Area (PUMA) p in year t—moved. PUMAs are the smallest publicly available
21

The patterns are similar if I restrict the sample to migrants originally living in cross-state commuting
zones (Appendix Figure A22).
22
The federal employee share is similar if I exclude people initially in the Washington, D.C., area (D.C.,
Maryland, and Virginia).
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measure of geography in the ACS. The explanatory variable of interest is the indicator
Orginially in Birth State, which equals 1 if state-PUMA p was in the individual’s state of
birth. The PUMA by year fixed effects (δpt ) makes this a comparison of individuals who
originally were living in the same local area at the same time, to see if people living in their
birth state respond differently, in terms of mobility, to local conditions than others living in
the area. I will see how estimates differ when I include demographic controls (gender, race,
marital status, number of children, and education), age fixed effects (αa ), and occupational
fixed effects (γo ). Since place of work and commuting are measured contemporaneously in
the ACS, I replace Originally in Birth State with Currently in Birth State when examining
commuting.
Among people in the same local area, individuals born in that state are 1.3–3.5 percentage
points (9–23 percent) less likely to move at all, relative to individuals who were born in
another state. However, conditional on moving at all, people in their birth state are about 5
percentage points (31 percent) more likely to move to a different PUMA within the same state
but about 15 percentage points (63 percent) less likely to move out of state than individuals
born elsewhere (Table 2). In other words, people living in their birth state are only slightly
less likely to move at all, but significantly more likely to move out of the local area (but stay
in state) and significantly less likely to leave the state. Residing in one’s birth state also
affects cross-border commute rates. Workers living in their birth state are 1.7–1.9 percentage
points (11–13 percent) less likely to commute out of state relative to workers living outside
their birth state. Thus, living in one’s birth state appears to influence mobility across state
borders, which could have large implications in aggregate, as approximately 52 percent of
adults reside in their state of birth.
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5

Connectedness: The Correlation Between Cross-Border Social
Networks and Mobility

Less cross-border mobility of individuals in their birth state reiterates the potential role
of connectedness and local ties. If county-to-county connections are stronger within state
than across state, this could influence mobility rates. In Figure 7, I explore this further by
estimating Equations (1) and (2) with the scaled number of Facebook friends between each
county pair divided by the origin population as the outcome. This measure is known as the
SCI and is constructed from a snapshot of active Facebook users in 2016. Like migration
and commuting, there is a distance gradient in the number of Facebook friends, but once
again, conditional on distance, friendship rates are significantly lower for cross-border county
pairs than for counties in the same state. Including origin and destination fixed effects or
differences in labor market, demographic, amenities, or housing markets between the origin
and destination do not significantly impact the pattern.
Furthermore, controlling for the origin/destination Facebook friendship rate in addition
to the other controls in Equation (2) considerably compresses the gap in migration associated
with state borders (Figure 8). For close counties (15–25 miles apart), the gap falls from 3–6
migrants per 1,000 people to 0.5–2 migrants per 1,000 people. Interestingly, the distance
gradient for cross-state pairs completely disappears when we control for the social network
(consistent with Diemer (2020)), but there is still a slight distance gradient for same-state
county pairs. The gap in commute rates associated with state borders completely disappears,
as well as the distance gradient, suggesting that after controlling for the strength of social
connections, state borders have no additional impact on commute flows.
First, it must be acknowledged that a causal relationship between migration, commuting,
and social networks could go in either (or both) directions. Weaker social networks across
state borders could impose large psychic costs or information frictions, leading to low levels
of mobility. Alternatively, low levels of cross-border migration and commuting for other

24

reasons could lead to more regional isolation and lower social network spread across state
borders. The fact that social network strength can empirically explain most of the stateborder discontinuity in mobility does not pinpoint a particular mechanism, but is consistent
with several channels of effect. First, fewer social connections across state borders might
impose large psychic costs and reduced mobility. For example, people might be less willing
to move 20 miles away across the state border if they have fewer family or friends there.
Second, weaker social networks across state borders might lead to less information about
circumstances and opportunities across the state border, resulting in less mobility if people
are risk averse. Finally, people could exhibit local ties (like state identity or home bias) that
makes them less likely to move away and in equilibrium less likely to have social links across
state borders.

5.1

Psychic Costs

Existing work suggests that the nonmoney, psychic costs associated with leaving social connections are large (Kosar et al., 2020). Local ties to friends and family can keep people in
weak labor markets and lead to depressed migration levels (Zabek, 2020). The nonpecuniary,
psychic cost mechanism implies a direction of causality. If social networks are weaker across
state borders, for any reason, mobility across state lines will become more costly, leading to
lower migration and commute flows. Psychic costs related to social ties, however, does not
explain why the social network was weaker across state borders initially.

5.2

Information Frictions

Since social networks become more sparse across state lines, people might have less access
to information about opportunities, differentially keeping people from fully understanding
returns and conditions in counties outside of their home state. These frictions could keep
people from following the behavior in Equation (3). Previous work has found that access
to information about government programs increases welfare migration (McCauley, 2019)
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and information about labor demand shocks increases migration to economic opportunities
(Wilson, 2020b). Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2017) argue that improved access to information has allowed people to avoid moves that result in low-quality matches and helped
contribute to the decline in internal migration over the last 40 years. The information friction mechanism implies a similar causal direction as the psychic cost mechanism. Weaker
social networks across state borders lead to less information about opportunities in markets
across state lines, potentially reducing mobility flows. Without an exogenous source of information or change in the social network, we cannot disentangle the psychic cost/social ties
mechanism from the information friction mechanism.

5.3

State Identity and Home Bias

Other behavioral biases and frictions might also exist. For example, people might exhibit a
state identity that creates a “home bias,” making it systematically more costly to move away
from their home state. This can be viewed as a nonmoney migration cost but is potentially
distinct from the psychic cost of leaving social ties. The presence of home bias is consistent
with less cross-state mobility from people in their birth state and more cross-state mobility
from people originally outside of their birth state. Importantly, the state identity mechanism
would imply a different direction of causality relative to the other two mechanisms. A third
factor (state identity) leads to both lower mobility and fewer friendship links across the state
border. As such, it might be possible to separately test for these effects.
In general, the SCI does fall across state lines, but this is not universally true. There
are cross-border areas with stronger friendship networks. This presents a setting in which to
estimate the relative importance of these mechanisms in a horse race regression. Following
Bailey et al. (2018), I construct “Connected Communities” based on the strength of the
SCI. After prespecifying a number of clusters, Connected Communities are constructed by
grouping contiguous counties into clusters in which the social ties are stronger within the
cluster than if a county was attached to a different, neighboring cluster. As seen in Figure
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9, when there are 50 connected communities, the cluster borders approximate state borders,
but there are obvious differences where communities spill across state borders. For example,
New England is grouped as one cluster, Arizona and New Mexico are merged, and northern
Texas, Oklahoma, and parts of Kansas are combined into one Connected Community. There
are similar cross-border aberrations when 25 or 75 Connected Communities are created.23
This would suggest that in some areas, strong social ties permeate state borders. If I treat
Connected Communities as pseudo states and reestimate Equation (2), but use Connected
Community borders, we see that these pseudo borders have the same directional impact
on migration and commuting (Appendix Figure A23). Conditional on distance, migration
rates across pseudo borders are about one-third to one-half as high as migration within the
Connected Community.
This provides an opportunity to test the relative explanatory power of state borders
versus Connected Community pseudo borders. If the empirical pattern in mobility is driven
by a drop in social network strength across state borders due to either psychic costs or
information frictions, we would expect the cross-border drop in migration and commuting to
load onto the Connected Community pseudo borders rather than the state borders. I modify
Equation (2) to include the full set of different state-by-distance interactions and different
Connected-Community-by-distance interactions to test the explanatory power of the two in
a horse race regression. As seen in Figure 10, most of the effect loads onto the physical state
border, rather than the Connected Community borders.24 This is true for any prespecified
number of communities, between 10 and 500 (Figure A25). This would suggest that the drop
in mobility is less associated with the social network border than it is with the physical state
23

Fifty Connected Communities include one each in Alaska and Hawaii, which are not presented on the
map.
24
Although state borders are precisely measured, community borders are inherently measured with error.
This might result in community borders carrying less predictive power. Using Connected Community assignments between 25 and 75 clusters, I calculate the fraction of scenarios in which each county pair is assigned
to the same cluster. I then weight each county pair observation by (µ − 0.5)2 , where µ is the fraction of
times (out of 51) that the counties are in a different Connected Community. As such, county pairs that have
more consistent Connected Community assignments receive more weight, while pairs where the assignment
changes (plausibly because they are close to a social network “border”) are down-weighted. The results are
similar (Appendix Figure A24).

27

border. As both psychic and information friction channels suggest that the gap is driven
by weaker social networks, these mechanisms are not likely to explain the impact of state
borders on migration and commute flows. Although psychic costs and information frictions
undoubtedly influence migration decisions and flows, they do not appear to explain the drop
in mobility at state borders.25

Theoretical Formulation
The empirical pattern is consistent with home bias or state identity. This could be interpreted in the context of the behavioral phenomenon of endowment effects. Individuals are
“endowed” with an initial location (for example, their birth state), which impacts their total
cost of moving or their willingness to pay for a move. If this bias was present, two individuals
with identical preferences over local characteristics would have different migration propensities if one was born in the origin and the other was not. This bias could on average lead
to lower mobility and weaker social networks across state borders. The role of loss aversion
and endowment effects in mobility decisions is not a new idea, but the existing discussion is
limited to loss associated with the physical home (Genesove and Mayer, 2001; Morrison and
Clark, 2016; Schkade and Kahneman, 1998).
Consider the following extension of the migration choice model in Equation (3), above,
for an individual who was born in or grew up in state S.

M oveiod =




1 if ui (Xd ) − ui (Xo ) ≥ ciod + c̃i (o, d)

(8)



0 else
25

The pattern is similar when considering other well-defined, nongovernment borders, such as time zones.
Among the 10 states split by time-zone borders, county-to-county migration and commute flows between
counties in the same state across time-zone lines do not experience the same penalty, even though there are
potential economic costs associated with these borders (Appendix Figure A26).

28

where c̃i (o, d) is an individual specific nonlinear cost function, as follows:

c̃i (o, d) =




ϕ if o ∈ S and d ∈
/S


0

(9)

else

The additional cost, ϕ, is only incurred if o is in the individual’s initially endowed state S
and d is not in S. So, if the individual is considering a move within state or is already outside
state S, this additional cost is zero.
Consider an individual who exhibits a home-state identity and currently lives in origin
o, a location in their birth state S. If there are two potential destinations, d and d′ , that
have identical characteristics (Xd = Xd′ ), but d is in the birth state S and d′ is in a different
state,
ciod ∗ = ui (Xd ) − ui (Xo ) > ui (Xd′ ) − ui (Xo ) − ϕ = ciod′ ∗

(10)

The cost threshold for moving to d (in the birth state) is higher than the threshold for moving
to d′ (in a different state). As such, a larger share of the population at o would be willing
to move to d than d′ , even though the two destinations are identical on observables. Note,
however, that if o is not in the state of birth, the propensity to move to the two locations
is identical. Home bias or state identity can generate an endowment effect that produces
theoretical results that match the empirical patterns. Consistent with the phenomenon that
people in the ACS microdata are less likely to move if they currently reside in their birth
state, we would expect to observe that people with a home bias or state identity would be
less likely to move out of state if they are currently living in their birth state. The home
identity need not be linked to the state of birth, although this is often where people spend
their formative years, and information on birth state is available in many data sets.
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Empirical Evidence
A preference for one’s own state and how this impacts migration is not captured in most
surveys, making it difficult to test the relevance of this mechanism. To the extent possible, I
explore three separate settings to document this relationship, both descriptively and, under
certain assumptions, causally.
Gallup Poll State Preference. First, if the drop in mobility at state borders is driven
by a state identity, we would expect the drop to be larger in places with a stronger state
identity. In a 2013 Gallup poll, approximately 600 adults across all states were asked whether
or not they would describe the state where they live as “the best,” “one of the best,” or “the
worst” state to live in.26 The share of residents who felt their state was “the best” varied
across states. For example, 28 percent of Texas residents felt that Texas was “the best”
state to live in, while only 3 percent of Rhode Island residents felt their state was “the best”
(see Appendix Table A2 for a full list). Since this measure is fixed across origin county, it is
directly absorbed in origin county fixed effects. However, I can estimate how this measure
interacts with the impact of state borders on county-to-county migration and commute flows
by modifying Equation (2) as follows:

Yod = β1 Diff. State + β2 Diff. State*Share Feel State is “the Best”s +
59
X

′
γb (b Miles Apart) + Xod
Γ + ϕo + δd + εod (11)

b=15

In this regression, I still flexibly control for distance, but only the average effect of being in
a different state for counties 15 to 60 miles apart is estimated. This parametric restriction
allows for more precision than mile-by-mile estimates. I then interact state borders with the
share of residents who felt their state was “the best” to test whether the state border has
more or less predictive power in states that appear to have a stronger state identity.
26

Survey
results
were
released
here:
https://news.gallup.com/poll/168653/
montanans-alaskans-say-states-among-top-places-live.aspx.
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Consistent with the border penalty in Figure 1, being across a state border is associated
with 0.6 fewer migrants and 5.3 fewer commuters per 1,000 residents (columns 1 and 3 of
Table 3). When we interact this with state identity, we see that the state border is not
associated with any change in migration for counties in states with no state identity (e.g.,
0 percent of respondents think their state is “the best”). However, a 10 percentage point
increase in the number of respondents who think their state is “the best” is associated with
0.9 fewer migrants per 1,000 residents to cross-border counties. For commuting, the direct
effect of state borders is smaller when interacting with state identity but is still significant,
and the strength of the origin state identity leads to significant reductions in commuters
across state borders. This descriptive evidence is consistent with state identity contributing
to the drop in mobility at state borders.
Pew Research Poll State Identity. As we saw in the ACS microdata, residing in
your birth state is associated with only a slightly smaller probability of moving overall,
but a substantially lower probability of moving out of state. However, this cannot solely
be attributed to a birth state identity or home bias, as family ties can also be at play.
Fortunately, in 2008, the Pew Research Center conducted a survey on individual mobility
(Pew Research Center, 2009). This survey asked over 2,000 people about their moving
history, asked about the places that they identify with and why, and presented hypothetical
moving scenarios. As such, it is possible to observe how many people identify with their birth
state and whether this identity is associated with the stated and revealed preference about
moving, independent of other more studied phenomena like personal ties (Zabek, 2020) and
the draw of amenities (Kosar et al., 2020).
Unfortunately, individuals in the survey who had moved and those who had not are asked
slightly different questions. Individuals who had moved are asked, “You mentioned that you
have lived in other places. When you think about the place you identify with the most—that
is, the place in your heart you consider to be home—is it the place you live now, or is it some
other place?” If the individual answered someplace else—or answered yes to the follow-up
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question, “Is there a place where you have lived that you identify with almost as much as
where you live now?”—they were asked to identify the place and the state of that place.
Based on these measures, I identify movers who exhibit a birth-state identity or say they
identify with their birth state.
Individuals who had never lived away from their local community were asked separate
questions. Nonmovers were asked to identify whether various factors were a “major reason,”
“minor reason,” or not a reason they have not moved. In particular, nonmovers were asked
about factors related to local, personal ties (i.e., family ties, connections to friends, or community involvement), local attributes or amenities (i.e., job or business opportunities, cost of
living, the climate, a good place to raise children, recreation and outdoor activities, medical
or health reasons, or cultural activities), or identity and attachment to the region (i.e., “no
desire to live someplace else,” “I just feel I belong here,” or “I grew up here”). I classify
nonmovers as exhibiting a birth state identity if they listed one of the three identity factors
as a “major reason” they have not moved. Overall, 59.2 percent of movers are classified as
having a birth state identity, as well as 81.4 percent of nonmovers. This averages out to an
overall level of 68 percent.
Using this data, I estimate the relationship between having a birth state identity and
attitudes towards migration as follows:

Yis = βBirth State Identityi + Xi′ Γ + δs + εi

(12)

The outcomes of interest are measures of migration for individual i in state s. Birth State
Identity is defined as described above. I control for age and age squared, as well as for fixed
effects for gender, race, ethnicity, and education. Current state-of-residence fixed effects are
also included. Estimates are weighted using the provided survey weights, and standard errors
are corrected for clustering at the current state-of-residence level. I extend this equation in
two ways. First, I include indicators for whether the individual reports familial ties or local
amenities (e.g., labor market, schools, cultural amenities) as a major reason that person lives
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where he or she currently does, to verify that state identity has an independent effect and is
not simply colinear with familial or amenity ties. Second, I interact the birth-state identity
measure, as well as the family and amenity ties measure, with an indicator that equals 1 if
the individual currently resides in his or her birth state. Consistent with the endowmenteffect model, I can test if birth-state identity impacts migration attitudes differently when
someone currently lives in his or her birth state. This is estimated as

Yis = β1 Birth State Identityi + β2 Birth State Identityi ∗ In Birth Statei
+ β3 Family Tiesi + β4 Family Timesi ∗ In Birth Statei
+ β5 Amenity Tiesi + β6 Amenity Tiesi ∗ In Birth Statei
+ β7 In Birth Statei + Xi′ Γ + δs + εi . (13)

Having a birth-state identity is associated with differences in migration history and stated
preferences (Table 4). People with a birth preference are 35.3 percentage points less likely
to ever have left their birth state (a 64 percent reduction at the mean), and 28.1 percentage
points (80 percent) more likely to say that the place they would prefer to live is in their
state of birth. If I control for whether an individual reports that the reason for being where
they are is due to family ties or local amenities, the impact of birth-state identity on ever
leaving one’s birth state is almost the same, at 32.8 percentage points, suggesting the effect
of birth-state identity is not simply colinearity.
Birth-state identity also reduces people’s stated preferences about moving. Overall, individuals with birth-state identity are no less likely to report that they are likely to move, but
individuals with birth-state identity that currently reside in their birth state are 13.1 percentage points (35 percent) less likely to move. Even when controlling for having family ties or
ties to local amenities in their current residence, being in one’s birth state with a birth-state
identity is still associated with a 12.3 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of moving.
The pattern is similar when respondents were asked about moving to certain cities. Overall,
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having a birth-state identity is not associated with a lower propensity to state that they
would move, but having a birth-state identity and residing in one’s birth state is associated
with an 8.4–9.0 percentage point reduction in being willing to move. This is consistent with
a home bias that makes out-of-state moves away from the home state more costly, relative
to other moves. Given the large share of individuals that exhibit birth-state identity and
that reside in their birth state, this could explain a significant decline in migration across
state borders. The tie to an initial state of residence could reflect a home bias that keeps
people from moving across state borders, introducing a behavioral bias into the migration
choice model.
PSID Sibling Comparison. The proceeding evidence on birth-state identity and home
bias is correlational and suggestive. However, I can corroborate this evidence with a quasiexperimental approach. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), I compare the
mobility patterns of siblings. This within-family comparison allows me to control for shared
unobservables of siblings. First, I identify families that move between children’s births, so
that one sibling is living in his or her birth state at age 16 and the other sibling is not. I
then compare these children’s propensity, once they reach adulthood, to move away from the
state they resided in when they were 16. If state identity (in this case, birth-state identity)
and endowment effects matter in the migration decision, the sibling who does not reside in
his or her birth state at age 16 would not incur the extra cost of leaving his or her initial
endowment, and should be more likely to move. This pattern is supported in the data.
Relative to their siblings no longer residing in their birth state at 16, children living in their
birth state are 10–15 percentage points less likely to move away from that state as an adult
(Table 5).27 More work is needed to explore the existence of birth-state identity and the
extent to which it causally restricts mobility.28 Unfortunately, these topics are not frequently
27

The pattern still holds when controlling for whether or not the mother ever lived in the child’s 16-yearold state while the child was an adult. If I also control for the share of the child’s first 16 years they lived in
their birth state, the coefficient on residing in one’s birth state at age 16 is almost the same but imprecisely
estimated. This might suggest that it is the state a child spends his or her formative years in that matters,
not just the place in which that child was born.
28
Another potential mechanism for “home bias” would be the in-state preference among public universi-

34

measured in administrative data or large-scale surveys.

6

Impact of State-Border Discontinuities on Local Labor Market
Adjustment to Shocks

Regardless of whether the reduction in mobility is due to state identity or some other factor,
it is unclear if this empirical pattern has real impacts. Migration flows are an important
mechanism for labor markets to adjust to local shocks (Blanchard and Katz, 1992), and
reducing migration frictions in general (not border specific) can increase global productivity
and welfare (Desmet et al., 2018). Reduced mobility between neighboring counties on state
borders might inhibit the rate at which labor markets adjust. This could lead to long-run
differences in local economic conditions across geography.
In recent work, Hershbein and Stuart (2020) use event study methods to explore the employment dynamics of local labor markets after recessions in the U.S.29 They find that places
that experienced larger employment declines during the 2007–2009 recession see persistently
lower levels of employment up to 10 years later.
Building on their framework, I estimate a similar event study framework but allow the
dynamics of border and nonborder counties to differ. Because of the state border, migration to and from neighboring counties will be more constrained in border counties than in
nonborder counties. I estimate this as follows:
ln(Yct ) =

2017
X

γτ (CZ shock*Year τ )+θτ (Border*Year τ )+βτ (Border*CZ shock*Year τ )+δc +αt +εct (14)

τ =2003

The outcome of interest is the natural log of total employment, the employment-to-population
ratio, migration rates (in and out), and commute rates (in and out) in county c in year t.
ties. In Appendix Figure A27, I test to see whether cross-state migration is different in origin states where
the share of public university enrollment that comes from within state is above the median from origin states
where it is below the median. This does not appear to affect the drop in migration across state borders.
Having a university in the state with students enrolled from nearly all of the states (45) also does not appear
to explain the drop in cross-state migration, although the estimates are less precise here.
29
Since treatment starts at the same time, this approach does not face many of the challenges highlighted
for event studies with staggered treatment timing (Callaway and Sant’Anna, 2020; de Chaisemartin and
D’Haultfœuille, 2020; Goodman-Bacon, 2021; Sun and Abraham, 2020).
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This is regressed on a set of year fixed effects interacted with CZ shock, the size of the recession in the local labor market (commuting zone), measured as the change in commuting zone
log employment between 2007 and 2009. The commuting zone is used to measure the shock
so that counties in the same commuting zone experience the same treatment. Following
Hershbein and Stuart (2020), 2005 is used as the omitted year.30 I also include two more
sets of interactions. The border-by-year interactions capture differential time trends between
border and interior counties, while the border-by-year-by-size-of-the-shock interactions allow
the dynamic effect of the shock to deviate for counties on the state border (Border = 1).
The dynamic effects for nonborder counties are represented by the γτ coefficients, while the
dynamic effects of the shock for border counties are represented by γτ + βτ . County and
state by year fixed effects are also included. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at
the level at which the recession shock is measured, the commuting zone. Event study plots
are presented in Figure 11.
For both border and non-border counties, prerecession trends are flat, and recessions lead
to a large, persistent decrease in employment and in the employment-to-population ratio.
However, in border counties, both employment and the employment-to-population ratio are
persistently lower, and there is very little recovery up to 10 years after the shock. These gaps
are large, even 10 years later the employment levels in border counties remain 40 percent
lower than employment in nonborder counties in the same state which experienced the samesized cyclical shock. Year-to-year effects are only significantly different between border and
nonborder counties in the later years, but outcomes from 2008 on are jointly significantly
different. A 10 percent drop in local employment during the great recession is associated
with approximately 5 percent lower employment in 2017 in nonborder counties, but with an
effect nearly twice that size (9.1 percent) in border counties. In short, border counties have
experienced little to no employment recovery 10 years after the start of the Great Recession.
30

Results are similar if I control for the 2005 outcome rather than the county fixed effect, as suggested by
Hershbein and Stuart (2020) (see Appendix Figure A28). Because the shock is constructed at the commuting
zone rather than the county level, the mechanical relationship between the “treatment” and the outcome is
broken.
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Consistent with state borders influencing mobility, this appears to be driven by differences in
in-migration and in-commuting. After a 10 percent drop in employment during the recession,
in-migration to border counties is nearly 4 percent lower than in nonborder counties for the
first 6 years of recovery after the end of the recession. In-commuting to border counties
is also around 4 percent lower during the recovery through the end of the sample in 2017.
Out-migration and out-commuting from border counties is also lower, but not significantly
different. This pattern is consistent with prior work, showing that in-migration is more
responsive to local economic shocks (Monras, 2018), but appears to be amplified in border
counties, where the border imposes an additional friction on mobility.31
Being a border county and experiencing less migration from neighboring counties leads to
less labor market recovery after a recession, and more persistent negative impacts. Regardless
of the mechanism behind the state-border discontinuity in migration, this empirical pattern
has large and lasting impacts on labor market dynamism.32

7

Conclusion

I present new evidence that both residential and employment county-to-county mobility in
the U.S. falls discontinuously across state borders. The drop in cross-state migration is large
(a 60–70 percent reduction for close counties), persists when examining border counties or
counties in the same labor market, and is not confined to particular demographic groups.
Using the theoretical migration choice model to infer potential causes of this pattern, I find
that differences in local characteristics which could differentially impact utility do not drive
31

Consistent with the drop in in-migration, total population also falls more in border counties, although
the difference is not significant. The impacts on employment would suggest that the employment propensity
of in-migrants must be different in border and nonborder counties. County border status does not appear
to have differential impacts on average weekly wages.
32
For reference, state border status leads to a similar decline in employment recovery as national border
status, but unlike counties on the national border, the gap in employment and employment-to-population
ratios does not close by 2017 (Appendix Figure A30). For completeness, I also examine the employment
response to positive local economics shocks in the form of fracking booms. In this setting, employment in
border counties appears to grow more slowly, but the difference is not significant: in-commuting to border
counties is actually higher. (Appendix Figure A31).

37

the difference. Occupational licensing and state income taxation, as well as state welfare
generosity, do not appear to drive the gap. Other pecuniary adjustment costs are unlikely
to be the sole driving force, as county-to-county commuting, a form of temporary, repeated
mobility, follows a similar pattern.
County-to-county connectedness plays a potentially important role. Facebook friend
networks exhibit a similar drop across state borders, and controlling for the Facebook network
drastically mitigates the cross-state mobility gap. This empirical pattern is consistent with
either psychic costs, information frictions, or home bias driving the relationship. Patterns in
the data are most consistent with home bias, or state identity, reducing people’s willingness to
move out of their home state. The data provide less evidence that a lack of social connections
or information that might be transferred through social networks is causing mobility to drop
across state borders.
This empirical pattern has real economic impacts. Border counties see lower in-migration
and in-commuting after local economic shocks, and persistently lower employment levels.
This sheds new light on how we should view and evaluate geographic differences in labor
market dynamism. Future work is needed to better pinpoint two aspects: 1) the role of
behavioral biases, like home bias or state identity, in reducing mobility across state borders,
and 2) whether there are policy tools that can mitigate or offset the economic impact of this
feature of migration behavior.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: County-to-County Migration and Commute Rates by Distance for Same-State and Different-State County Pairs

44
NOTE: Outcome in the left panel is number of migrants per 1,000 people at the origin county using the IRS SOI county-to-county flows from
2017. Outcome in the right panel is the number of commuters per 1,000 people at the origin county using the LODES origin-destination employment
statistics aggregated to the county level from 2017. These measures are then averaged into one-mile bins for county pairs in the same state and county
pairs in different states. Distance is the distance between the population-weighted county centroids. “With Controls” plots coefficients from Equation
(2), accounting for origin fixed effects, destination fixed effects, and differences between the origin and destination county in labor market measures
(the unemployment rate, employment-to-population ratio, average weekly wages, number of establishments), differences in industry shares (share of
natural resources and mining, construction, manufacturing, trade, information, finance, professional, education and health, hospitality, public sector,
and all others), differences in demographics (total population, share female, non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic other, Hispanic,
under 20, 20–34, 35–49, 50–64, and 65 and older), differences in natural amenities (the January average temperature, January average sunlight, July
average temperature, July average humidity, and the USDA natural amenities scale), the 2016 presidential Republican vote share, differences in the
county housing price index converted to dollars using the median house value from 2000, and differences in average third- through eighth-grade math
and reading language arts test scores. Ninety-five-percent confidence intervals are provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2017 IRS SOI and 2017 LODES.

Figure 2: Sensitivity of Migration and Commuting across State Borders
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NOTE: Coefficients from Equation (1) are plotted. Migration is plotted in the top panel, commuting in the bottom. The left panel restricts the
sample to only include counties within 60 miles of a county in a different state. The right panel only includes counties within 60 miles of a county
in a different state, but distance is the number of minutes of travel time between the population-weighted county centroids. “With Controls” plots
coefficients from Equation (2), accounting for origin fixed effects, destination fixed effects, and differences between the origin and destination county
in labor market measures (the unemployment rate, employment-to-population ratio, average weekly wages, number of establishments), differences in
industry shares (share in natural resources and mining, construction, manufacturing, trade, information, finance, professional, education and health,
hospitality, public sector, and all others), differences in demographics (total population, share female, non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black,
non-Hispanic other, Hispanic, under 20, 20–34, 35–49, 50–64, and 65 and older), differences in natural amenities (the January average temperature,
January average sunlight, July average temperature, July average humidity, and the USDA natural amenities scale), the 2016 presidential Republican
vote share, differences in the county housing price index converted to dollars using the median house value from 2000, and differences in average thirdthrough eighth-grade math and reading language arts test scores. Ninety-five-percent confidence intervals are provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2017 IRS SOI and 2017 LODES.

Figure 3: Impact of State Borders on Migration and Commuting in Close, Connected Regions
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NOTE: Coefficients from Equation (2) are plotted. Migration is plotted in the top panel, commuting in the bottom. The left panel restricts the
sample to include only counties in commuting zones (CZ) that cross state borders and to include only county pairs that are in the same CZ. The middle
panel includes only counties in MSAs that cross state borders and includes only county pairs that are in the same MSA. The right panel includes only
counties that are on state borders and are contiguous. Estimation controls for origin fixed effects, destination fixed effects, and differences between
the origin and destination county in labor market measures (the unemployment rate, employment-to-population ratio, average weekly wages, number
of establishments), differences in industry shares (share in natural resources and mining, construction, manufacturing, trade, information, finance,
professional, education and health, hospitality, public sector, and all others), differences in demographics (total population, share female, non-Hispanic
White, non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic other, Hispanic, under 20, 20–34, 35–49, 50–64, and 65 and older) differences in natural amenities (the
January average temperature, January average sunlight, July average temperature, July average humidity, and the USDA natural amenities scale),
the 2016 presidential Republican vote share, differences in the county housing price index, converted to dollars using the median house value from
2000, and differences in average third- through eighth-grade math and reading language arts test scores. Ninety-five-percent confidence intervals are
provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2017 IRS SOI and 2017 LODES.

Figure 4: Role of State Taxation: Migration and Commuting across State Borders
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NOTE: Coefficients from Equation (6) are plotted. Migration is plotted in the top panel, commuting in the bottom. The left panel plots differences
by state+federal income tax burdens for a married household with two dependents with $75,000 annual income. The middle panel plots differences by
state sales tax rates. The right panel plots differences by the maximum state corporate tax rate. Controls include origin fixed effects, destination fixed
effects, and differences between the origin and destination county in labor market measures (the unemployment rate, employment-to-population ratio,
average weekly wages, number of establishments), differences in industry shares (share in natural resources and mining, construction, manufacturing,
trade, information, finance, professional, education and health, hospitality, public sector, and all others), differences in demographics (total population,
share female, non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic other, Hispanic, under 20, 20–34, 35–49, 50–64, and 65 and older) differences
in natural amenities (the January average temperature, January average sunlight, July average temperature, July average humidity, and the USDA
natural amenities scale), the 2016 presidential Republican vote share, differences in the county housing price index, converted to dollars using the
median house value from 2000, and differences in average third- through eighth-grade math and reading language arts test scores. Ninety-five-percent
confidence intervals are provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2017 IRS SOI and 2017 LODES.

Figure 5: Role of State Benefits and Welfare: Migration and Commuting across State Borders
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NOTE: Coefficients from Equation (6) are plotted. Migration is plotted in the top panel, commuting in the bottom. The left panel plots differences
by the prevailing minimum wage. The middle panel plots differences by generosity of the state EITC. The right panel plots differences by whether
the state expanded Medicaid after the Affordable Care Act. Controls include origin fixed effects, destination fixed effects, and differences between
the origin and destination county in labor market measures (the unemployment rate, employment-to-population ratio, average weekly wages, number
of establishments), differences in industry shares (share in natural resources and mining, construction, manufacturing, trade, information, finance,
professional, education and health, hospitality, public sector, and all others), differences in demographics (total population, share female, non-Hispanic
White, non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic other, Hispanic, under 20, 20–34, 35–49, 50–64, and 65 and older) differences in natural amenities (the
January average temperature, January average sunlight, July average temperature, July average humidity, and the USDA natural amenities scale),
the 2016 presidential Republican vote share, differences in the county housing price index converted to dollars using the median house value from
2000, and differences in average third- through eighth-grade math and reading language arts test scores. Ninety-five-percent confidence intervals are
provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2017 IRS SOI and 2017 LODES.

Figure 6: Role of Demographics: Cross-State Migration and Commuting across Demographic Groups in the ACS
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NOTE: Each point represents the share of migrants that moved across state borders within the past year using the 2012–2017 ACS (left) or the
share of commuters who travel across state lines when they commute using the 2012–2017 ACS (right).
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2012–2017 ACS.

Figure 7: Impact of State Borders on County-to-County Facebook Friendship Rates
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NOTE: Coefficients from Equations (1) and (2) are plotted where the outcome is the number of Facebook friends of residents in the destination
county per person in the origin county in 2000 using the SCI. The number of Facebook friends is scaled by an unknown constant, for privacy.
Ninety-five-percent confidence intervals are included.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2016 SCI and 2017 IRS SOI.

Figure 8: Mediating Role of Facebook network on Migration and Commuting across State Borders
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NOTE: Coefficients from Equation (2) are plotted, where the outcome is the migration rate (left) or the commute rate (right), and when we also
control for the county-to-county Facebook friendship rate. Ninety-five-percent confidence intervals are included.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2016 SCI, 2017 IRS SOI, and 2017 LODES.

Figure 9: Connected Community Clusters Based on Facebook Friendship Links, 50 Communities
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NOTE: Connected Community boundaries plotted when there are 50 connected community clusters. These clusters capture contiguous counties
and cover the entire country.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2016 SCI.

Figure 10: Horserace Regression: Relative Importance of Physical State Borders versus Pseudo Connected Community Borders
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NOTE: Sample restricted to counties that are less than 60 miles from another county in a different state. The outcomes are migration rates (left)
and commuting rates (right). Each panel plots the coefficients from Equation (2) but includes the full set of state-border-by-distance interactions and
the connected-community-border-by-distance interactions. Ninety-five-percent confidence intervals are provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2016 SCI, 2017 IRS SOI, and 2017 LODES.

Figure 11: Impact of State Borders on Labor Market Recovery after the Great Recession
NOTE: Event study coefficients from Equation (14) are plotted with 95 percent confidence intervals and
represent the percent change in outcomes relative to 2005 for each percentage point increase in commuting
zone employment reduction between 2007 and 2009. Observation at the county by year level. County, stateby-year fixed effects, as well as an indicator for being a border county interacted with year fixed effects, are
included. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the commuting zone level.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2000–2017 QCEW and 2000–2017 IRS SOI, and 20032017 LODES.
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Table 1: Impact of State Occupational Licenses on Cross-State Migration, ACS Microdata
Sample: All Individuals
Move Out of State in Last Year
(1)
(2)
(3)
Licensed Occupation

Occupation F.E.
State and Year F.E.
Occupation by Year F.E.
Dependent Mean
Observations
Licensed Occupation

Occupation F.E.
State and Year F.E.
Occupation by Year F.E.
Dependent Mean
Observations

0.001
(0.002)

0.001
(0.002)

X

X
X

0.023
9,493,532

0.023
9,493,532

0.001
(0.002)

0.001
(0.002)

X

X
X

0.023
9,493,532

0.023
9,493,532

Sample: All Movers
Move Out of State in Last Year
(4)
(5)
(6)

All Commuters
Commute Out of State
(7)
(8)
(9)

More Restrictive Measure of Occupational Licensing
0.001
0.004
0.003
0.003
0.001
(0.002)
(0.013)
(0.012)
(0.013)
(0.003)
X
X
X
X
X
X
0.023
0.169
0.169
9,493,532 1,271,370 1,271,370

X
X
X
0.169
1,271,370

X

X
X
X
0.169
1,271,370

0.001
(0.001)

X
X

X
X
X
0.039
4,300,760

0.039
0.039
4,300,760 4,300,760

Less Restrictive Measure of Occupational Licensing
0.001
0.000
0.001
0.001
-0.003*
(0.002)
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.010)
(0.002)
X
X
X
X
X
X
0.023
0.169
0.169
9,493,532 1,271,370 1,271,370

0.001
(0.001)

X

-0.001
(0.001)

-0.001
(0.001)

X
X

X
X
X
0.039
4,300,760

0.039
0.039
4,300,760 4,300,760

NOTE: Sample restricted to adult respondents to the 2015–2017 ACS. State occupational licensing
measures constructed from the Current Population Survey(CPS) questions on job certification. From 2015
on, CPS respondents have been asked if they have a professional certificate or license; if the license was issued
by the federal, state, or local government; and if the government-issued license is required for their job. I then
construct the share of adults in state-by-year-by-four-digit occupation bins that report having a governmentissued license. As (Kleiner and Soltas, 2019) report, occupational licensing in the CPS is measured with
error. Even universal licensed occupations have licensure rates below 100 percent. To indicate the presence of
a license, I indicate whether the fraction of adults in the state, year, occupation bin that report a government
license is over a given threshold. In the top panel, the threshold is 25 percent. In the bottom panel, the
threshold is 10 percent. For migration outcomes, fixed effects for state of residence one year ago are included
in columns (2) and (4). For commuting, fixed effects for the current state of residence are included in
column (6). Standard errors corrected for clustering at the state level (state of residence in previous year for
migration, current state for commuting). p < 0.1 = *; p < 0.05 = **; p < 0.01 = ***.
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Table 2: Relationship between Birth State Residence and Migration
Among Movers
Move at All
(1)
(2)
Originally in Birth State

-0.013***
(0.002)

-0.035***
(0.001)

Move Out of PUMA, Stay in State
(3)
(4)
0.048***
(0.002)

0.052***
(0.002)

Among Commuters
Move Out of State
(5)
(6)
-0.152***
(0.004)

-0.157***
(0.003)

Currently in Birth State

Demographic Controls
Dependent Mean, Not Birth State
0.15
Observations
18,871,967

X
0.15
18,871,967

0.16
2,537,353

X
0.16
2,537,352

0.24
2,537,353

Commute Out of State
(7)
(8)

X
0.24
2,537,352

-0.019***
(0.002)

-0.017***
(0.001)

0.05
8,426,384

X
0.05
8,426,383

NOTE: Sample restricted to adult respondents to the 2012–2017 ACS. Estimates obtained by regressing Equation (7). For migration outcomes,
PUMA by state of residence one year ago fixed effects are included in columns. For commuting, PUMA by current state of residence fixed effects are
included. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the state-by-PUMA level (previous year’s state for migration, current year’s state for commuting).
p < 0.1 = *; p < 0.05 = **; p < 0.01 = ***.
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Table 3: Heterogeneous Impact of State Border on Mobility by Strength of State Identity,
Gallup Survey
Migrants per 1,000
(1)
(2)
Diff. State

-0.602***
(0.030)

Diff. State*Share Feel
State is the Best
Dependent Mean
Observations

Commuters per 1,000
(3)
(4)

0.088
-5.315*** -3.138***
(0.121)
(0.228)
(0.783)
-8.987***
-28.353***
(0.121)
(0.783)

1.15
35,242

1.15
35,214

8.98
35,242

8.98
35,214

NOTE: Observation at the origin/destination county pair level, using the IRS SOI 2017 data. Diff. State
is an indicator for whether the counties are in different states. Share Feel State is “the Best” is obtained from
a 2013 Gallup survey on own-state preferences and measured at the state level. All regressions include onemile-distance bin fixed effects, origin fixed effects, destination fixed effects, and differences between the origin
and destination county in labor market measures (the unemployment rate, employment-to-population ratio,
average weekly wages, number of establishments), differences in industry shares (share in natural resources
and mining, construction, manufacturing, trade, information, finance, professional, education and health,
hospitality, public sector, and all others), differences in demographics (total population, share female, nonHispanic White, non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic other, Hispanic, under 20, 20–34, 35–49, 50–64, and 65
and older) differences in natural amenities (the January average temperature, January average sunlight, July
average temperature, July average humidity, and the USDA natural amenities scale), the 2016 presidential
Republican vote share, differences in the county housing price index converted to dollars using the median
house value from 2000, and differences in average third- through eighth-grade math and reading language
arts test scores. Distance is the distance between the population-weighted county centroids. Standard errors
are corrected for clustering at the origin county level. p < 0.1 = *; p < 0.05 = **; p < 0.01 = ***.
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Table 4: Relationship between Birth State Identity and Migration, Pew Mobility Survey

Birth State Identity

Ever Left Birth State
(1)
(2)

Birth State Preferred
(3)
(4)

Likely Move in Next 5 Years
(5)
(6)

Would Move to One of MSA Provided
(7)
(8)

-0.353***
(0.021)

0.281***
(0.027)

-0.019
(0.037)
-0.131**
(0.055)

0.043
(0.027)
-0.084**
(0.041)

0.019
(0.055)

-0.011
(0.038)
-0.123**
(0.057)
-0.073**
(0.035)
-0.001
(0.046)
0.063
(0.043)
-0.112**
(0.055)
0.118*
(0.063)

0.008
(0.031)

0.045
(0.027)
-0.090**
(0.041)
-0.024
(0.028)
0.037
(0.035)
0.075*
(0.038)
-0.063
(0.046)
0.045
(0.055)

0.370
1,948

0.370
1,948

0.781
1,948

0.781
1,948

-0.328***
(0.022)

0.268***
(0.026)

Birth State Identity*In Birth State
Family Ties

-0.143***
(0.025)

0.072***
(0.021)

0.019
(0.028)

-0.005
(0.025)

Family Ties*In Birth State
Amenity Ties
Amenity Ties*In Birth State
In Birth State
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Dependent Mean
Observations

0.555
1,948

0.555
1,948

0.351
1,949

0.351
1,949

NOTE: Sample restricted to U.S.-born survey respondents from the 2008 Pew Research Center Mobility Survey. Regression controls for sex,
education level, race, ethnicity, age and age squared, as well as current state of residence fixed effects. Observations are weighted using the Pew
Research Center survey weights. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the current state of residence level. p < 0.1 = *; p < 0.05 = **; p < 0.01
= ***.

Table 5: Propensity to Move Out-of-State if Living in Birth State at 16, PSID Sibling Comparison

(1)
In Birth State at 16

-0.067 -0.096**
(0.042) (0.046)

Mother Present in 16-Year-Old
State During Time Period
Share of First 16 Years
in Birth State
Birth State and Cohort F.E.
Mother F.E.
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Dependent Mean
Observations

Moved from State Lived in at 16-Years-Old
Between Ages 18-30
Between Ages 18-40
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
-0.104**
-0.094
(0.045)
(0.078)
-0.303*** -0.304***
(0.069)
(0.069)
-0.016
(0.096)

X
X
X
X
X
X
Birth Cohorts 1968-1989
0.216
0.216
0.222
0.222
5,205
5,205
4,768
4,768
X

-0.131**
(0.056)

-0.146**
(0.067)

-0.150**
(0.068)
-0.304***
(0.114)

(8)
-0.127
(0.110)
-0.304***
(0.114)
-0.043
(0.133)

X
X
X
X
X
X
Birth Cohorts 1968-1979
0.240
0.240
0.246
0.246
3,258
3,258
3,003
3,003
X

NOTE: Sample restricted to children of the PSID that were born in 1968 or later, so that state of residence at birth can be established. Outcome
variables are indicators for whether the individual has moved from the state that individual lived in at 16 by the specified ages. Only moves in
adulthood are included. In Birth State at 16 indicates whether the child is living in his or her state of birth at age 16. In 1999, the PSID moved to
a biannual survey. As such, outcomes at specific ages are not observed for cohorts born later. For this reason, I update variables to go through the
specified age plus one for cohorts that are not surveyed when they reach the specified age (e.g., 16, 30, or 40). Samples are restricted to include birth
cohorts that reach the maximum age specified in the outcome by 2019, the last available year in the data. Mother fixed effects are included to make
this a within-sibling comparison. Birth-cohort fixed effects control for fixed differences in the propensity of moving by birth year, while birth-state
fixed effects control for fixed differences in the propensity of moving across birth states. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the mother ID
level. p < 0.1 = *; p < 0.05 = **; p < 0.01 = ***.

Appendix Tables and Figures
Table A1: Share of Counties with Labor Market or Housing Conditions Nearby
Distance Between Origin and Destination
In Different Commuting Zone
<30 Miles
(1)

<60 Miles
(2)

<90 Miles
(3)

<30 Miles
(4)

<60 Miles
(5)

<90 Miles
(6)

10 Percent Lower
20 Percent Lower
30 Percent Lower

0.54
0.31
0.13

Exists County with Unemployment Rate...
0.81
0.90
0.30
0.73
0.63
0.77
0.17
0.55
0.39
0.53
0.07
0.34

0.87
0.73
0.51

10 Percent Higher
20 Percent Higher
30 Percent Higher

0.53
0.36
0.22

Exists County with Average Weekly Wages...
0.83
0.91
0.28
0.74
0.70
0.83
0.16
0.60
0.56
0.74
0.09
0.45

0.88
0.79
0.69

10 Percent Lower
20 Percent Lower
30 Percent Lower

0.60
0.48
0.36

Exists County with Average House Price...
0.85
0.93
0.39
0.80
0.75
0.84
0.31
0.69
0.60
0.71
0.24
0.56

0.91
0.82
0.69

10 Percent Difference
20 Percent Difference
30 Percent Difference

0.25
0.12
0.05

0.48
0.28
0.17

Both Wages and Housing...
0.61
0.13
0.37
0.06
0.24
0.03

0.58
0.35
0.22

0.41
0.24
0.14

NOTE: Shares reported based on 2017 measures. Unemployment data obtained from the BLS LAUS;
”Average Weekly Wages” obtained from the QCEW; ”Average House Price” obtained by combining FHFA
county house price indices with home values from the 2000 census to estimate 2017 average house prices.
”Distance” is the distance between county population centroids. SOURCE: Author’s own calculations.
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Table A2: Share of Gallup Respondents Who Feel Their State Is the Best Possible State to
Live In
State

Share of Respondents Who Feel Their State
is the Best Possible State to Live In

TEXAS
ALASKA
HAWAII
MONTANA
NORTH DAKOTA
WYOMING
COLORADO
UTAH
WASHINGTON
VERMONT
SOUTH DAKOTA
NEW HAMPSHIRE
MINNESOTA
IOWA
CALIFORNIA
OREGON
FLORIDA
WEST VIRGINIA
IDAHO
TENNESSEE
ARIZONA
SOUTH CAROLINA
MAINE
NEBRASKA
ALABAMA
GEORGIA
NEVADA
NEW YORK
KENTUCKY
WISCONSIN
ARKANSAS
VIRGINIA
LOUISIANA
OKLAHOMA
MISSISSIPPI
DELAWARE
MASSACHUSETTS
PENNSYLVANIA
NEW JERSEY
INDIANA
NORTH CAROLINA
KANSAS
MICHIGAN
MARYLAND
NEW MEXICO
OHIO
MISSOURI
ILLINOIS
RHODE ISLAND
CONNECTICUT

0.28
0.27
0.25
0.24
0.21
0.21
0.18
0.15
0.14
0.14
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.03

NOTE: Estimates constructed by Gallup, based on a 2013 survey of nearly 600 respondents. Obtained
from Gallup at https://news.gallup.com/poll/168653/montanans-alaskans-say-states-among-top-places-live.
aspx?version=print.
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Figure A1: County-to-County Migration and Commute Rates by Distance for Same-State and Different-State County Pairs,
Regression Estimates
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NOTE: Outcome in the left panel is number of migrants per 1,000 people at the origin county using the IRS SOI county-to-county flows from
2017. Outcome in the right panel is the number of commuters per 1,000 people at the origin county using the LODES origin-destination employment
statistics aggregated to the county level from 2017. Point estimates from Equation (1) are plotted with 95 percent confidence intervals.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2017 IRS SOI and 2017 LODES.

Figure A2: Relationship over Time: Impact of State Borders on County-to-County Migration
and Commuting from 1992 to 2017

NOTE: The reduction in migration (blue) and commuting (red) associated with state borders for each
year from 1992 to 2017 are plotted with 95 percent confidence intervals. Average migration rates for samestate and cross-state county pairs in the 20-mile bin are plotted for 1992–2017. These estimates are obtained
by regressing Equation (2) for each year from 1992 to 2017 separately, then estimating the ratio of area
under the curve for same-state and cross-state county pairs between 15 and 60 miles apart. In 2011, the IRS
extended the data collection period from September to the end of the year, which includes more complicated
returns. They also used the information of other household members to identify links over time. Prior
to 2013, county-to-county flows below 10 tax units (households) was suppressed. In 2013 that limit was
increased to 20.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the IRS county-to-county flows from 1992 to 2017, LODES
data from 2003 to 2017.
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Figure A3: Counties within 60 Miles of a County in a Different State
NOTE: Counties with a population centroid less than 60 miles from the population centroid of another
county in a different state are indicated.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations.
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Figure A4: County-to-County Migration and Commute Rates by Distance and for Same-State and Different-State Counties,
Including Closer and Farther Distance Bins
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NOTE: Outcome in the left panel is number of migrants per 1,000 people at the origin county using the IRS SOI county-to-county flows from
2017. Outcome in the right panel is the number of commuters per 1,000 people at the origin county using the LODES origin-destination employment
statistics aggregated to the county level from 2017. Point estimates are obtained by estimating an equation similar to Equation (2), but more distance
bins are added. The ”<11 bin” includes all pairs less than 11 miles apart. Ninety-five-percent confidence intervals are provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2017 IRS SOI and 2017 LODES.

Figure A5: Impact of State Borders on Migration and Commuting in Cross-Border Designated Market Areas

NOTE: Coefficients from Equation (2) are plotted. Migration is plotted in the left panel, commuting in
the right. The sample is restricted to include only counties in DMAs that cross state borders and to include
only county pairs that are in the same DMA. Estimation controls for origin fixed effects, destination fixed
effects, and differences between the origin and destination county in labor market measures (the unemployment rate, employment-to-population ratio, average weekly wages, number of establishments), differences
in industry shares (share in natural resources and mining, construction, manufacturing, trade, information, finance, professional, education and health, hospitality, public sector, and all others), differences in
demographics (total population, share female, non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic other,
Hispanic, under 20, 20–34, 35–49, 50–64, and 65 and older), differences in natural amenities (the January
average temperature, January average sunlight, July average temperature, July average humidity, and the
USDA natural amenities scale), the 2016 presidential Republican vote share, differences in the county housing price index converted to dollars using the median house value from 2000, and differences in average thirdthrough eighth-grade math and reading language arts test scores. Ninety-five-percent confidence intervals
are provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2017 IRS SOI and 2017 LODES.
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Figure A6: Impact of State Borders on Migration and Commute, Excluding County-to-County Flows of Zero
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NOTE: Outcome in the left panel is number of migrants per 1,000 people at the origin county using the IRS SOI county-to-county flows from
2017. Outcome in the right panel is the number of commuters per 1,000 people at the origin county using the LODES origin-destination employment
statistics aggregated to the county level from 2017. Point estimates from Equations (1) and (2) are plotted with 95 percent confidence intervals. Sample
restricted to exclude county-to-county observations where the migration/commute rate is zero. Some of these zero flows are artificially suppressed for
data privacy.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2017 IRS SOI and 2017 LODES.

Figure A7: Impact of State Borders on Migration and Commuting, by Census Region
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NOTE: Coefficients are plotted from Equation (2), estimated separately by origin-county census region. Migration is plotted in the top panel,
commuting in the bottom. Estimation controls for origin fixed effects, destination fixed effects, and differences between the origin and destination
county in labor market measures (the unemployment rate, employment-to-population ratio, average weekly wages, number of establishments), differences in industry shares (share in natural resources and mining, construction, manufacturing, trade, information, finance, professional, education and
health, hospitality, public sector, and all others), differences in demographics (total population, share female, non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black,
non-Hispanic other, Hispanic, under 20, 20–34, 35–49, 50–64, and 65 and older) differences in natural amenities (the January average temperature,
January average sunlight, July average temperature, July average humidity, and the USDA natural amenities scale), the 2016 presidential Republican
vote share, differences in the county housing price index, converted to dollars using the median house value from 2000, and differences in average
third- through eighth-grade math and reading language arts test scores. Ninety-five-percent confidence intervals are provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2017 IRS SOI and 2017 LODES.

Figure A8: Impact of State Borders on Migration and Commute, Estimated by MSA
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NOTE: The ratio of cross-border migration/commuting relative to within-state migration/commuting for county pairs in the same MSA is plotted
for each MSA that crosses state borders and has more than one county in each state.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2017 IRS SOI and 2017 LODES.

Figure A9: Impact of State Borders, States Separated by Rivers vs. Arbitrary Borders
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NOTE: Sample restricted to counties that are less than 60 miles from another county in a different state. Coefficients from Equation (6), where
the characteristic is the presence of a river border between states. Ninety-five-percent confidence intervals are provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2017 IRS SOI and 2017 LODES.

Figure A10: Role of Differences in Utility: Changes in Local Characteristics at State Border

NOTE: Average difference in characteristics in one-mile bins for county pairs in the same state and
different states are plotted with local linear polynomial regressions and 95-percent confidence intervals.
There are few county pairs within 15 miles of each other, and these are excluded from my main analysis.
These pairs are shaded in gray for reference.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the QCEW 2017, SEER 2017 data, NCSL 2016 vote data,
FHFA HPI 2017 data, and SEDA 2008–2017 test score data.
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Figure A11: Role of Differences in Utility: Changes in Local Industry Composition at State
Border
NOTE: Average difference in characteristics in one-mile bins for county pairs in the same state and
different states are plotted with local linear polynomial regressions and 95 percent confidence intervals.
There are few county pairs within 15 miles of each other, and these are excluded from my main analysis.
These pairs are shaded in gray for reference.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the QCEW 2017 data.
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Figure A12: Role of Differences in Utility: Changes in Local Characteristics at State Border,
Weighted Points

NOTE: Average difference in characteristics in one-mile bins for county pairs in the same state and
different states are plotted with local linear polynomial regressions and 95 percent confidence intervals.
Points are weighted by the number of county pairs. There are few county pairs within 15 miles of each other,
and these are excluded from my main analysis. These pairs are shaded in gray for reference.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the QCEW 2017, SEER 2017 data, NCSL 2016 vote data,
FHFA HPI 2017 data, and SEDA 2008–2017 test score data.
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Figure A13: Occupation-Level Cross-State Migration and Commuting by Occupational Licensing
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NOTE: Each point represents the migration/commuting rates by occupational code and governmental licensure status using the 2015–2017 ACS.
For each occupation there are two points, one for workers in licensed states and time periods, one for workers in nonlicensed states and time periods.
Sample restricted to occupations that are licensed in some states but not all. The size of the point is scaled to represent the population-weighted
number of people in the occupation. The blue linear prediction is for nonlicensed occupations. The pink linear prediction is for licensed occupations.
Linear predictions include 95-percent confidence intervals.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2015–2017 ACS.

Figure A14: Role of State Income Taxation Reciprocity Agreements
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NOTE: Coefficients from Equation (6) are plotted, where the high/low difference is whether the origin and destination state have a tax reciprocity
agreement. Migration is plotted in the left panel, commuting in the right. The same controls are included as listed in the notes for Figure 1.
Ninety-five-percent confidence intervals are provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2017 IRS SOI and 2017 LODES.

Figure A15: Role of State Income Taxation: Migration and Commuting across State Borders, Married, Filing Jointly with Two
Dependents
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NOTE: Coefficients from Equation (6) are plotted. Migration is plotted in the top panel, commuting in the bottom. The point estimates represent
differences by state+federal income tax burdens for a married household with two dependents with various levels of annual income. The same controls
are included as listed in the notes for Figure 1. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2017 IRS SOI and 2017 LODES.

Figure A16: Role of State Income Taxation: Migration and Commuting across State Borders, for a Single Individual
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NOTE: Coefficients from Equation (6) are plotted. Migration is plotted in the top panel, commuting in the bottom. The point estimates represent
differences by state+federal income tax burdens for a single individual with various levels of annual income. The same controls are included as listed
in the notes for Figure 1. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2017 IRS SOI and 2017 LODES.

Figure A17: Role of State Income Taxation: Migration and Commuting across State Borders, for a Joint Filer with no
Dependents
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NOTE: Coefficients from Equation (6) are plotted. Migration is plotted in the top panel, commuting in the bottom. The point estimates represent
differences by state+federal income tax burdens for a married, joint household with no children with various levels of annual income. The same controls
are included as listed in the notes for Figure 1. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2017 IRS SOI and 2017 LODES.

Figure A18: Share of Households That Move Out-of-State by Expected Percent Increase in
Tax Burden
NOTE: Sample is limited to families originally living in a commuting zone that crosses a state border.
Each point represents the share of migrants that moved across state borders, by the difference in the average
total income tax burden associated with moving between the origin state and the other state(s) in the
commuting zone. If there are more than two states in a commuting zone, the average total income tax
burden is used. Results are similar if instead the maximum or minimum total income tax burden is used.
The black line indicates the linear relationship.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2012–2017 ACS Microdata.
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Figure A19: Impact of State Borders on Migration and Commuting by Pre-K–12 Per Pupil Spending and TANF Generosity
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NOTE: Coefficients from Equation (6) are plotted. Migration is plotted in the top panel, commuting in the bottom. The left panel plots differences
by pre-K–12 per-pupil public school spending. The right panel plots differences by the TANF benefit rate. Controls include origin fixed effects,
destination fixed effects, and differences between the origin and destination county in labor market measures (the unemployment rate, employment-topopulation ratio, average weekly wages, number of establishments), differences in industry shares (share in natural resources and mining, construction,
manufacturing, trade, information, finance, professional, education and health, hospitality, public sector, and all others), differences in demographics
(total population, share female, non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic other, Hispanic, under 20, 20–34, 35–49, 50–64, and 65 and
older) differences in natural amenities (the January average temperature, January average sunlight, July average temperature, July average humidity,
and the USDA natural amenities scale), the 2016 presidential Republican vote share, differences in the county housing price index, converted to
dollars using the median house value from 2000, and differences in average third- through eighth-grade math and reading language arts test scores.
Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the IRS county-to-county flows from 2017.

Figure A20: Impact of State Borders on Migration and Commuting by County Home Rule Regulation
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NOTE: Coefficients from Equation (6) are plotted. Migration is plotted on the left, commuting on the right. Differences by the presence of
Home Rule laws (as reported by Shoag et al., 2019). Controls include origin fixed effects, destination fixed effects, and differences between the
origin and destination county in labor market measures (the unemployment rate, employment-to-population ratio, average weekly wages, number
of establishments), differences in industry shares (share in natural resources and mining, construction, manufacturing, trade, information, finance,
professional, education and health, hospitality, public sector, and all others), differences in demographics (total population, share female, non-Hispanic
White, non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic other, Hispanic, under 20, 20–34, 35–49, 50–64, and 65 and older) differences in natural amenities (the
January average temperature, January average sunlight, July average temperature, July average humidity, and the USDA natural amenities scale),
the 2016 presidential Republican vote share, differences in the county housing price index, converted to dollars using the median house value from
2000, and differences in average third- through eighth-grade math and reading language arts test scores. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are
provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations, using the IRS county-to-county flows from 2017.

Figure A21: Census Tract-to-Tract Commute Rates by Distance for Same-County and
Different-County Tract Pairs

NOTE: The outcome is the number of commuters per 1,000 people at the origin tract using the LODES
origin-destination employment statistics aggregated to the tract level from 2017. ”Miles Apart” is the distance between the population-weighted tract centroids. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2017 LODES.
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Figure A22: Role of Demographics: Cross-State Migration across Demographic Groups in
the ACS, All Individuals

NOTE: Each point represents the share of individuals that moved across state borders within the past
year, according to the 2012–2017 ACS.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2012–2017 ACS.
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Figure A23: Impact of Pseudo Connected Community Borders on Migration and Commuting
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NOTE: Sample restricted to counties that are less than 60 miles from another county in a different state. The outcomes are migration rates (left)
and commuting rates (right). Each panel plots the coefficients from Equation (2) but includes the full set of connected-community-border-by-distance
interactions rather than state-border-by-distance interactions. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2016 SCI, 2017 IRS SOI, and 2017 LODES.

Figure A24: Horserace Regression: Relative Importance of Physical State Borders versus Pseudo Connected Community Borders,
Weighted by Connected Community Border Persistence
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NOTE: Sample restricted to counties that are less than 60 miles from another county in a different state. The outcomes are migration rates (left)
and commuting rates (right). Each panel plots the coefficients from Equation (2) but includes the full set of state-border-by-distance interactions and
the connected-community-border-by-distance interactions. Observations are weighted with the following weights (µ − 0.5)2 , in which µ is the fraction
of times (out of 51) the counties are in a different connected community when all prespecified cluster numbers from 25 to 75 are included. The weights
subtract 0.5 and are squared so that the more county pairs have the same assignment, the higher the weight. This captures greater confidence in the
connected community assignment. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2016 SCI, 2017 IRS SOI, and 2017 LODES.

Figure A25: Horserace Regression: Relative Importance of Physical State Borders versus Pseudo Connected Community Borders
for Various Prespecified Numbers of Connected Communities
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NOTE: Sample restricted to counties that are less than 60 miles from another county in a different state. The outcomes are migration rates (left)
and commuting rates (right). Each point is a measure of the gap in migration due to physical state borders or pseudo connected community borders
from Equation (2) but includes the full set of state-border-by-distance interactions and the connected-community-border-by-distance interactions,
where the prespecified number of connected communities is varied between 10 and 500. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2016 SCI, 2017 IRS SOI, and 2017 LODES.

Figure A26: County-to-County Migration and Commute Rates by Distance across Time Zone Borders among Counties in the
Same State
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NOTE: Outcome in the left panel is number of migrants per 1,000 people at the origin county using the IRS SOI county-to-county flows from
2017. Outcome in the right panel is the number of commuters per 1,000 people in the origin county using the LODES origin-destination employment
statistics aggregated to the county level from 2017. Only counties in the same state, in states that span multiple time zones, are included. Distance
is the distance between the population-weighted county centroids. The “Controls” specifications plots coefficients from Equation (2), accounting for
origin fixed effects, destination fixed effects, and differences between the origin and destination county in labor market measures (the unemployment
rate, employment-to-population ratio, average weekly wages, number of establishments), differences in industry shares (share in natural resources
and mining, construction, manufacturing, trade, information, finance, professional, education and health, hospitality, public sector, and all others),
differences in demographics (total population, share female, non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic other, Hispanic, under 20, 20–
34, 35–49, 50–64, and 65 and older) differences in natural amenities (the January average temperature, January average sunlight, July average
temperature, July average humidity, and the USDA natural amenities scale), the 2016 presidential Republican vote share, differences in the county
housing price index, converted to dollars using the median house value from 2000, and differences in average third- through eighth-grade math and
reading language arts test scores. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2017 IRS SOI and 2017 LODES.

Figure A27: Identity from State Colleges: Migration by Interstate Connectivity of State Colleges
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NOTE: Sample restricted to counties that are less than 60 miles from another county in a different state. Coefficients from Equation (2), in which
the characteristic is whether public four-year institutions have an above- or below-median share of own state students (in the left Panel) and whether
there is a university in the state with students from 45 or more states. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are provided.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2017 IRS SOI.

Figure A28: Impact of State Borders on Labor Market Recovery after the Great Recession,
Lagged Outcome Control
NOTE: These estimates are similar to those in Figure 11, but rather than including county fixed effects, I
control for the county-level outcomes from 2005, as suggested by (Hershbein and Stuart, 2020). Event study
coefficients are plotted with 95 percent confidence intervals and represent the percent change in outcomes,
relative to 2005, for each percentage-point increase in commuting-zone employment reduction between 2007
and 2009. Observation at the county-by-year level. State-by-year fixed effects, as well as an indicator for
being a border county interacted with year fixed effects, are included. Standard errors corrected for clustering
at the commuting zone level.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2000–2017 QCEW and 2000–2017 IRS SOI.
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Figure A29: Impact of State Borders on Population and Wages after the Great Recession

NOTE: Event study coefficients from Equation (14) are plotted with 95 percent confidence intervals and
represent the percent change in outcomes relative to 2005, for each percentage point increase in commutingzone employment reduction between 2007 and 2009. Observation at the county by year level. County,
state-by-year fixed effects, as well as an indicator for being a border county interacted with year fixed effects
are included. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the commuting-zone level.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2000–2017 QCEW and 2000–2017 IRS SOI, and 2003–
2017 LODES.
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Figure A30: Impact of State Borders on Labor Market Recovery after the Great Recession,
Relative to Counties on the National Border

NOTE: Event study coefficients from Equation (14) are plotted with 95 percent confidence intervals and
represent the percent change in outcomes, relative to 2005, for each percentage point increase in commuting
zone employment reduction between 2007 and 2009. However, counties on the national border (bordering
either Canada or Mexico) are also allowed to have separate effects. Observation is at the county-by-year
level. County, state-by-year fixed effects, as well as an indicator for being a border county interacted with
year fixed effects, are included. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the commuting-zone level.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations, using the 2000–2017 QCEW and 2000–2017 IRS SOI, and 2003–
2017 LODES.
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Figure A31: Impact of State Borders on Labor Market Impacts of Fracking

NOTE: Event study coefficients from estimation similar to Equation (14) are plotted with 95 percent
confidence intervals, but rather than the change in employment from 2007–2009, the total simulated oil and
gas reserves (taken from (Wilson, 2020a)) are used. Observation is at the county-by-year level. County,
state-by-year fixed effects, as well as an indicator for being a border county interacted with year fixed effects,
are included. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the commuting-zone level.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2000–2017 QCEW and 2000–2017 IRS SOI, and 2003–
2017 LODES.
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For Online Publication: Appendix B. Data Appendix
Census Bureau County Geography Files
Sources: https://www.census.gov/geographies/reference-files/2000/geo/2000-centers-population.html
https://www.census.gov/geographies/reference-files/2010/geo/county-adjacency.html
To construct the analysis sample, I first use the 2000 county population centroid file, provided by the
Census Bureau. From this file, I preserve the county FIPS code and the county population centroid latitude
and longitude coordinates. I then expand this data set to pairwise match each county with every other
county in the United States. I then calculate the geodic distance between each county pair, and restrict
the sample accordingly. For most of the analysis, I focus on county pairs that are between 15 and 60 miles
apart, although in Appendix Figure A4 I extend the sample to include county pairs between 0 and 100 miles
apart. The main reason I restrict the sample by distance is for interpretability. As seen in Appendix Figure
B1, there are very few cross-state county pairs less than 15 miles apart. Similarly, as distance increases, the
number of county pairs that are in the same state also begins to fall, and the composition of same-state pairs
shifts towards larger, western states. To disentangle state border effects from compositional effects, I restrict
the sample to include a common support of both within-state and across-border county pairs, between 15
and 60 miles apart. I then connect this data to the county adjacency file, provided by the Census Bureau.
This file contains a list of all counties that border the focal county, allowing me to also identify neighboring
counties. I then merge this data with various data sources to capture migration, commuting, and other
local characteristics. Below, I describe each of the key data sets used in my analysis, as well as important
characteristics of data construction.

Figure B1: Number of County Pairs by Distance

NOTE: The number of within-state and across-state county pair bins are plotted in one-mile distance
bins.
SOURCE: Author’s own calculations using the 2000–2017 IRS SOI and 2003–2017 LODES.

Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income County Flows
Source: https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-migration-data
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Statistics of Income (SOI) division uses annual, household-level Tax
Form 1040 filings to construct annual counts of county-to-county flows of individuals and households. These
files provide the number of tax returns (to proxy for households) and exemptions (to proxy for individuals)
that were filed in one county in year t − 1 and in another county in year t. Most filing occurs between
February and April, so annual migration flows capture moves from approximately March or April from one
year to the next. For privacy purposes, the IRS suppresses county pairs that have fewer than 20 returns
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whose filers have moved in previous year. The suppression threshold increased from 10 to 20 returns in the
2013 data release. I record county pairs that are not observed, but that potentially have small, positive flows,
as zeroes. This potentially introduces measurement error. Because I am focusing on relatively close county
pairs (less than 60 miles apart), suppression is less of a concern than it would be for more distant county
pairs. As seen in Appendix Figure A6, the patterns are unchanged if I limit the sample to only include
nonsuppressed migration flows.
In 2011, the IRS made several changes. First, it extended the tax data collection period from September
to December. As such, households that requested extensions, which tend to be higher income, were more
heavily represented (Pierce, 2015). Second, the IRS also expanded the way that matches were identified
to consider all heads, spouses, and dependents. Using both the new method and the old method, the IRS
calculated state-level net migration rates to determine how much the series was affected. They find that
44 of the states (plus the District of Columbia) differed by less than 5 percent, and only Wyoming varied
by more than 10 percent. Throughout the analysis, I focus on the cross section in 2017, so estimates are
not impacted by these methodological changes over time. However, these changes might help explain the
variation in Figure A2, which plots the migration estimates back to 1992.
Some moves are not captured in the IRS data. Households with low income (between $12,000 and
$28,000 depending on age and filing status) are not required to file a Form 1040. However, many of these
households will file in order to receive transfer benefits administered through the tax system, like the EITC
and the child tax credit. The IRS tax data also will not capture successive moves within a year.

American Community Survey Microdata
Source: https://usa.ipums.org/usa/
The IRS county-to-county flows only provide aggregate flows, and do not provide flows for subpopulations
(e.g., gender, marital status, education). To explore heterogeneous out-of-state migration, I also exploit the
2012–2017 American Community Survey Microdata obtained from IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2019). The
ACS is an annual Census Bureau survey of approximately 1 percent of households each year. In addition to
collecting information about household structure, demographics (age, race/ethnicity, gender, marital status),
education, and employment, it asks individuals where they lived in the previous year, making it possible to
explore one-year migration patterns. The smallest geographic unit in the ACS is the Public Use Microdata
Area (PUMA). PUMAs are geographic areas defined by population that is large enough to preserve privacy.
Migration geographic data are only available at the Migration PUMA (MIGPUMA), which is an aggregation
of PUMAs to the county level or higher, depending on population size.33 Because MIGPUMA are often much
larger than counties, the ACS data is not fit to estimate the same county-to-county flow by distance equations
used with the IRS data. Instead, I focus on the probability of moving out of state, conditional on moving
at all, regardless of distance to the border. In the appendix, I also examine the unconditional probability of
moving out of state. I have also estimated ACS results focusing on individuals living in cross-state commuting
zones (to isolate people plausibly close to the border) and find a similar pattern of results.

LEHD Origin Destination Employment Statistics Commute Data
Source: https://lehd.ces.census.gov/data/
The LEHD Origin Destination Employment Statistics (LODES) links workers’ place of residence to their
place of work, at the census block pair level. As such, it is possible to construct measures of commuting.
Using census block to county crosswalks, I aggregate worker residence and work counts to the county level
to construct county-to-county commute flows. These data are available from 2002 on, but for consistency
I focus on the data from 2017. The LODES does provide some subpopulation counts, but only for broad
ranges involving age (under 30, 30–54, over 54), monthly earnings (under $1,250, $1,250–$3,333, over $3,333),
and industry (goods, trade/transportation, other) groups. Place of residence is missing for about 10 percent
of the LEHD worker sample, and is imputed using categorical models based on sex, age, race, income, and
county of work. For privacy, some noise is introduced at the census block level, which likely remains at the
county level, although to a lesser extent.
33

Only in several New England states are MIGPUMA smaller than the county level.
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Social Connectedness Index from Facebook Data
Source: https://data.humdata.org/dataset/social-connectedness-index?
To capture county-to-county social ties, I use the Social Connectedness Index (SCI), constructed by
Bailey et al. (2018). This measure is derived from Facebook microdata and counts the number of friendship
links between each county and every other county in the United States from a snapshot of active Facebook
users in 2016. An active user is “a registered Facebook user who logged in and visited Facebook through our
website or a mobile device, or used our Messenger application . . . in the last 30 days” (Bailey et al., 2018).
As such, I observe a static measure of each county’s social network, as captured by Facebook users. At the
time, there were 236 million active Facebook users in the U.S. and Canada (Bailey et al., 2018). I multiply
the SCI by 400, so that the smallest reported value is 1. This number is a scalar multiple of the actual
county-to-county number of friends, which is multiplied by a constant to preserve privacy. This measure has
been shown to be correlated with other proxies of social networks (Bailey et al., 2018). I originally obtained
it through an individual data use agreement, but the authors have since made versions of the data publicly
available at the link provided above.

Pew Social Trends – October 2008 Survey
Source: https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/dataset/mobility/
The October 2008 Pew Social Trends was a survey of 2,260 adults living in the continental United
States, conducted by Princeton Survey Research International between October 3 and 19, 2008. During the
20-minute survey, respondents were asked questions concerning place of residence, moving histories, what
places they identified with, why they identified with those places, and whether they would consider moves in
the future. I make use of several questions in particular. Question 17 asks what state individuals were born
in. Question 9 asks, “Have you lived in or near your local community your entire life, aside from the time
you may have spent away in school or college, or have you lived in other places?” With these two questions,
I am able to identify individuals who have never left their birth state.
Unfortunately, individuals who have ever moved are sometimes asked slightly different questions from
those who have never moved. Nonmovers are asked Question 15: “For each of the following, tell me if
this was a major reason, a minor reason, or not a reason you have lived there all your life.” They are
then presented with various reasons, including job or business opportunities, cost of living, family ties, no
desire to live someplace else, the climate, connections to friends, community involvement, “I just feel I belong
here,” a good place to raise children, recreational and outdoor activities, medical and health reasons, cultural
activities, or “I grew up here.” I split these reasons into three groups: 1) personal/social ties (family ties,
connections to friends, and community involvement); 2) amenity ties (job or business opportunities, cost of
living, the climate, a good place to raise children, recreational and outdoor activities, medical and health
reasons, and cultural activities); and place-based identity (no desire to live someplace else, “I just feel I
belong here,” and “I grew up here”). The place-based identity features tie an individual to an area, but not
necessarily because of local amenities or social connections in the area. I measure birth-state identity among
the nonmovers as anyone who reported a place-based identity reason as a major reason for living here all his
or her life.
Movers are asked Question 20, “When you think about the place you identify with the most—that is,
the place in your heart you consider to be home—is it the place you live now, or is it some other place?” In a
follow-up question, they are asked where that place is and which state it is in. Combining this information, I
can identify movers who exhibit a birth-state identity. Movers are also asked a question, similar to Question
15 for nonmovers, but the options are different: job or business opportunities, cost of living, family ties,
education or schooling, the climate, a good place to raise children, recreational and outdoor activities, medical
and health reasons, cultural activities, or retirement. As such, I can only compare birth-state identity to
family ties and amenity ties in Table 4.
All participants are asked in Question 38 which state they would prefer to live in, including their current
state of residence. From this, I can calculate whether participants would prefer to live in their birth state.
All participants are also asked in Question 8 how likely they are to move in the next five years. The sample
is then randomly split into three groups, and each is asked the following: “As I read through the following
places, just tell me your first reaction—Would you want to live in this city or its surrounding metropolitan
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area or NOT want to live there?” Participants are then given a list of 10 large metropolitan areas spread
throughout the country. Because only one-third of the sample is asked each of these questions, there is
not enough power to examine these separately. Instead, I create a binary outcome that equals 1 if the
individual said that they were willing to move to any of the cities. From this outcome, I estimate whether
birth-state identity is associated with a change in the probability of participants saying they would move to
a randomized list of large MSAs.
Because birth-state identity depends on observing the individual’s state of birth, foreign-born survey
participants are excluded from the analysis, leading to a sample of 1,949 individuals. All regression estimates
are weighted using the nationally representative survey weights provided by Pew.

Gallup Survey on Residents’ Views on Own State
Source: https://news.gallup.com/poll/168653/montanans-alaskans-say-states-among-top-places-live.aspx?version=print
Between June and December 2013, Gallup conducted a survey of more than 600 residents each for every
state. They specifically asked residents whether they view their state as “the best possible state to live in.”
Surveys were conducted by phone, and the sample is reweighted for sampling error, nonresponse, and to
match state demographics. I only observe Gallup’s state-level estimates of the share of residents that feel
their state is the “best possible state to live in,” the “best or one of the best possible states to live in,” or
the “worst possible state to live in.”

National Cancer Institute Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results Program
Source: https://seer.cancer.gov/popdata/download.html
I obtain annual, county-level population estimates from the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results
Program (SEER). The U.S. Census Bureau provides annual single-year age population estimates at the
county level to the National Cancer Institute. These estimates are available by gender and by race by origin
(Hispanic vs. Non-Hispanic). These population data are used in the denominator to create migration rates,
commute rates, and employment and population ratios. To construct these rates, I use the full population
in the denominator. I also construct race shares; gender shares; and age shares for under 20, 20–34, 35–49,
50–64, and over 64. These are then merged to both the origin and destination counties of each county pair.

Local Area Unemployment Statistics
Source: https://download.bls.gov/pub/time.series/la/la.data.64.County
I obtain county-level labor force, employment, and unemployment levels which we use to construct
unemployment rates from the BLS Local Area Unemployment Statistics. These measures are then merged
to the origin county and then again to the destination county to observe differences between origin and
destination counties.

Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
Source: https://www.bls.gov/cew/downloadable-data-files.htm
I obtain county-level annual measures of employment and wage earnings by industry from the BLS
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. I also construct employment industry shares for 10 broad
industries (natural resources, construction, manufacturing, trade, information, finance, professional, education and health, hospitality, and other). These measures are then merged to both the origin and destination
counties in each county pair. During this period, Shannon County, South Dakota, was changed to Oglala
County. To facilitate the merge, the FIPS code for Shannon County, South Dakota (46113), is changed to
the time-consistent Oglala County FIPS code (46102).
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Federal Housing Finance Agency House Price Index
Source: https://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Pages/House-Price-Index-Datasets.aspx#qexe
I obtain a county-level house price index from the Federal Housing Finance Agency. This is a developmental index that is not seasonally adjusted. This measure indicates how much house prices changed
within an area, but because they are normalized, it does not facilitate a cross-county comparison. To create
a comparable series, I collect county-level median house prices from the 2000 decennial census, then use the
price index to pull county-level prices forward and backward in time. This measure is then merged to both
the origin and destination county in each county pair.

2017 SUSB Annual Data Tables by Establishment Industry
Source: https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/susb/2017-susb-annual.html
I use the 2017 Statistics of U.S. Businesses annual table to estimate the number of establishments at the
county level. This measure is used to estimate strategic firm location behavior with respect to state borders.
I then merge these measures to both the origin and destination counties in each county pair. The number
of firms can also be captured in the QCEW and provides a similar pattern.

County Partisanship and 2016 Presidential Vote Share
Source: https://electionlab.mit.edu/data#data
I collect county voting patterns from 2000 to 2016 from the MIT Election Lab. We observe the vote
share for each party in each presidential election. We keep the Republican vote share in the 2016 election.
I then merge these measures to both the origin and destination counties in each county pair.

State Income Tax Burden
Source: http://users.nber.org/ taxsim/state-tax-rates/
Using state tax levels for representative taxpayers, calculated by NBER TAXSIM, I construct income tax
burdens. Some states do not have state income taxes. As such, I calculate the total federal plus state income
tax burden to calculate percent differences in income tax burden. Tax levels are calculated for taxpayers with
income of either $10,000, $25,000, $50,000, $75,000, or $100,000. Four different family types are considered:
1) single, 2) single/elderly, 3) joint (no dependents), and 4) joint with two dependents. We plot results for
single, joint (no dependents), and joint (two dependents) at all of the income levels.

State Income Tax Reciprocity Agreements
Source: https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/blog/state-by-state-reciprocity-agreements/
As upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne on May
15, 2015, states are not allowed to “double” tax income earned out of state. To avoid paying taxes in both
your state of work and state of residence, workers must typically file tax returns in both states, with a tax
credit in your state of residence for personal income tax paid in another jurisdiction. Filing taxes in both
states could impose an additional hassle cost associated with cross-border commuting. Some states include
tax-filing reciprocity agreements, so that workers only pay taxes based on their state of residence rather than
on their state of employment. This list was provided by Thomson Reuters, but similar lists can be found
elsewhere. New Jersey used to have a reciprocity agreement with Pennsylvania, but that was discontinued
in December 2016, meaning Pennsylvania residents working in New Jersey would have to file taxes in both
states to receive the credit.
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State

States with a Reciprocity Agreement

Arizona
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Montana
North Dakota
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Virginia
Washington, D.C.
West Virginia
Wisconsin

California, Indiana, Oregon, Virginia
Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Wisconsin
Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin
Illinois
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Washington, D.C., West Virginia
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin
Michigan, North Dakota
North Dakota
Minnesota, Montana
Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Pennsylvania, West Virginia
Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Virginia, West Virginia
Kentucky, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Washington, D.C., West Virginia
Maryland, Virginia
Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan

State Minimum Wages
Source: https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/state/minimum-wage/history
State minimum wages for 2017 are obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor. Some state minimum
wages are not universal, but rather apply to certain firm sizes. I keep the most universal minimum wage for
each state and merge this to both the origin and destination counties. For states without a state specific
statute, the federal minimum wage is used.

State EITC Supplement Rate
Source: https://users.nber.org/ taxsim/state-eitc.html
I collect state EITC supplement rates from the NBER for the year 2017. For most states, these rates
are percentage supplements to the federal EITC rate. There are several exceptions. The California rate
only applies to the phase-in region (until about $22,300 for households with children in 2017). The rate is
Wisconsin depends on the number of qualifying depends, for Wisconsin I keep the lowest rate of 4 percent.
I include both refundable and non-refundable credits.

State TANF Benefit Levels
Source: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32760.pdf
State Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF) maximum monthly benefit levels for a single-parent
family with two children are collected from Congressional Research Services, from March 2018. TANF is
distributed to states through a block grant, and states have flexibility over how these funds are used.

State by State Medicaid Expansion
Source: https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state-medicaid-expansion-decisions-interactivemap/
As part of the Affordable Care Act, states were allowed to expand Medicaid to include low-income adults
up to 138% of the federal poverty level. I collect records of states that had expanded Medicaid by December,
2017 from the Kaiser Family Foundation.

98

Pre-K Through 12 Public School Expenditures per Pupil
Source: https://ncses.nsf.gov/indicators/states/indicator/public-school-per-pupil-expenditures/table
I obtain county-level annual Pre-kindergarten through 12th grade public school spending per pupil from
the National Science Board, with statistics originally produced by the US Department of Education, National
Center for Education Statistics. The measure captures local, state, and federal spending on elementary and
secondary education, divided by pre-kindergarten through 12th grade public school enrollment. I then merge
this measure to both the origin and destination counties in each county pair.

State Sales Tax Rates
Source: https://taxfoundation.org/state-and-local-sales-tax-rates-in-2017/
I obtain state sales tax rates from the Tax Foundation for the year 2017. Average and maximum local
sales tax rates are also provided, but there is no indication of what counties these measures apply to. Some
states do not have sales tax. These measures are merged to both the origin and destination counties in each
county pair.

State Corporate Income Tax Rates
Source: https://taxfoundation.org/state-corporate-income-tax-rates-brackets-2017/
I obtain state corporate income tax rates from the Tax Foundation for the year 2017. Some states have
a single corporate income tax rates, others have a progressive schedule of rates ranging from 0 to 12 percent.
For each state I keep the maximum corporate income tax rate. This is then merged to both the origin and
destination county to determine if migration and commuting patterns differ when the potential destination
has higher or lower corporate tax rates.

Stanford Education Data Archive County-level Test Scores Version 4.1
Source:https://edopportunity.org/get-the-data/seda-archive-downloads/
County-level, standardized math and reading language arts (RLA) test scores are obtained through the
Stanford Education Data Archive (Fahle et al., 2021). These estimates provide measures of standardized
test achievement for students from 3rd to 8th grade between 2008 and 2018. I use the county-level pooled
by subject Bayesian Estimation estimates which average across all cohorts and years. These test scores are
derived from each state’s mandatory testing and are obtained through EDFacts at the U.S. Department
of Education. These scores are then mapped into a common scored exam, the National Assessment of
Educational Progress (NAEP) using Heteroskedasticity Ordered Probit models. The pooled mean estimates
are obtained through hierarchical linear modeling. I include the residual shrinking Empirical Bayes estimates.

Shoag, Tuttle, and Veuger (2019) Home Rule
Source: Obtained from the authors
I obtain measures of “home rule” or within state county-powers from (Shoag et al., 2019). This measure
captures the amount of county autonomy which might be related to state identity or individuality.
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